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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
The history of the 5th and 14th amendReats in 
the Miexican Constitution, has been* in the main, the 
his tory of the Supreme Courts interpretation of t h e 'due 
process' clause. In American Constitutional law, "no 
doctrine has enjoyed greater prest ige than 'due process ' . 
•Due process' was associated generally with procedural 
r ights . "The generation that fought the Civil War 
usually ident i f ied dxjs process with common law pirocedure". 
I t believed that due process was designed principal ly 
t o provide persons accused of crimes with the right t o 
counsel, protection against arrest without a warrant, and 
other procedural safeguards. The framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment, t oe , thought that due process of law 
had "the customary meaning recognised by 
the courts", which was xinquestionably prodecural. But 
l a t e r on 'due process of law' was held t o guarantee 
sxibstantlve as well as procedural r ights . The most 
2 important case was Wvnehaner V. New Yoric , where a s tate 
law was held inval id on the ground that i t violated the 
due process clause in the s tate const i tut ion. 
1. Charles M. Hough, "Due process of law-Today", 'Harward 
Law review. Vol 32 (1918-19) p . 224 
2 . 13 M.Y. 378 (1856). 
The Supreme court began to accept the doctrine that 
due process of law could be used to protect substantive 
as well as procedural rights against l e g i s l a t i v e act ions . 
The courts revolutionary shi f t from a narrow to broader 
conception of due process was gradual but unmistakable. 
The court thus converted the due process clause into a 
posit ive* jud ic ia l ly enforced restr ict ion over s tate 
l e g i s l a t i o n . After 1890, the Supreme Court was t o become 
the "perpetual censor • of s ta te l e g i s l a t i o n under the 
fourteenth Amendment and federal laws under the Fifth 
Amencteent. This new doctrine imposed upon the courts a 
new duty, the duty of applying to l eg i s la t ion the l imi-
tat ions of due process of law. Secondly, th i s duty made 
i t necessary for the courts to determine Just how the 
guarantees of due process of law could be used as yard-
s t i cks for measuring the va l id i ty of such l e g i s l a t i o n . 
This American doctrine of *due process' was Inducted 
in India in Draft Art 15 as or ig inal ly passed by the 
constituent Assembly, And the doctrine was supported 
by various arguments. But the Drafting committee sugg-
ested the substitution of the expression "except accor-
ding to procedure established by law" for the words 
"without due process of law", by giving his own reasons. 
Ultimately suggestions of Drafting committee prevailed 
over constituent Assembly. This change was the result 
of a discussion which the const i tut ional adviser. Sir 
B,N. Ilau h§d with Mr. Justice Frankfurter of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
The interpretation of the phrase 'procedure 
established by law in Art.21 came for consideration 
before supreme court in Gopalan's case . The supreme 
court in that case pointed out that the American conc^t 
of due process i s foreign to the Indian constitution and 
that in Art. 21 the expression "law" means only s t a t e made 
law and that in the absence of the concept of die process 
i t i s not open to the court to t e s t the law on the touch-
stone of reasonableness (Fazl All J. Dissenting). True i t 
i s that there i s provision in Art, 19 for tes t ing the 
reasonableness of laws regarding various aspects of 
freedom, including freedom of movement which was the 
right affected by the l eg i s la t ion inpugned in that case. 
But that Artic le could not be invoked for as observed by 
Kania# C.J.« 
"The question of the application of Art. 19 does 
not arise . The true approach i s only t o consider 
the directness of the l eg i s l a t i on and not what 
wi l l be the result of the detention, otherwise 
val id, on the mode of the detenu's l i f e . " 
The court held that the l e g i s l a t i o n i n quest ion 
d i r e c t l y re la ted t o personal l i b e r t y and prevent ive 
detent ion and so was governed only by Arts 21 and 22. 
Since Art 19(1) (d) re la ted t o freedom of inovtment, 
which was a d i f f e r e n t r ight , and t h e impugned l e g i s -
l a t i o n was not d i r e c t l y concerned with i t the p e t i t i o n e r 
could not be permitted t o invoice Art 19 ( l ) ( d ) . 
The way the majority handled Art, 21 in Gopalan 
was not free from c r i t i c i s m , Gopalan was character i sed as 
the . higb-water-mark of l e g a l p o s t i v i s m . Court's approach 
was very s t r i c t and purely l i t e r a l cUid was too much 
coloured by the p o s i t i v e or inoperative theory of law. 
The way Art. 21 was in terpre ted made i t impotent aga ins t 
l e g i s l a t i v e power which could make any law, however 
d r a s t i c , t o impose r e s t r a i n t s on personal l i b e r t y without 
being ob l iga ted t o lay down any reasonable procedure for 
the purpose. I t was not for the court to Judge whe ther 
the law proflded f o r f a i r o r reasonable procedure or not , 
Scrae of the arguments adopted by the majority t o reach 
the r e s u l t could not stand c l o s e s cru t iny for Ins tance , 
t h e concept of natural j u s t i c e decr ied by the court as 
vague and uncertain , i s not unknown in India . 
3 . Edward Mc Whinnev, J u d i c i a l review 133-138 
Two decades had to pass ]^e£ore the rationale 
uDderlying Gopalan's case could be dissected and rejected. 
The opportunity for th i s purpose presented I t s e l f in 
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the Bank's Nationalisatloo Case. Shah. J , , has now 
intiraatedt 
"In our Judgement, the assunption in Gopalan's case 
that certain ar t i c l e s in the constitution exclu-
s ively deal with speci f ic matters and in determining 
whether there i s infringement of the individuals 
guaranteed rights, the object and the form of 
the s tate action alone need be considered* and effect 
of the laws on fundamental rights of the individuals in 
general w i l l be ignored cannot be accepted as 
correct." 
The decision of the Supreme Court in the Batjik 
Nationalisaticn case i s a momentous decision not merely 
for the reason that i t had to d^al with a l e g i s l a t i v e 
measure destined t o have a tremendous impact upon the 
country*8 economy but for the further reaaon that i t 
has spel led out a new mode of approach to constitutional 
guarantees reorienting the techniques of interpretation 
which have prevailed with the supreme court in the f i r s t 
two decades after the inauguration of the new constitution 
4. (1970) I S.C.J. 564 
This decision bids fa i r to be the start ing point of a 
bold re-interpretation of the const i tut ion x;qpsetting 
many old fa i ths , creating new concepts and qpening up new 
horizons in the spacious domains of Indian constitutional 
law. 
The doctrine as propounded by Stxprewe Court In 
Bank Nationalisation was that the theory that the object 
and form of the s ta te action determine the extent of 
protection which the aggrie^«ed party might claim was 
not consistent with the constitutional scheme. The true 
view was that the extent of protection against impairment 
of a fundsnental right was determined not by the object 
of the l eg i s la ture nor by the form of the action, but by 
i t s direct operation upon the individuals right. 
I t was explainedlJ» Shambhu Hath SarkarV. State of 
W.B. that the major premise of the majority in the 
Gppalan case was held to be incorrect in the Bank Nationa^ 
l i za t ion case. Thus though a preventive detention law 
may pass the t e s t of Art. 22« i t has yet to sa t i s fy the 
requirement of other fundamental rights such as Art.19. 
Subsequently in the Maneka Gandhi, wMch Is a land-
mark case of the post emergency era, in his esqpoeiticn of the 
concept of procedure in Art. 21 Bha^ati* J. was inspired 
by the great equalising principle enunciated in Art,14, 
and extended i t s application t o t h e nature and require-
ment of the procedure under Art. 21. Thus Maneka was 
l imited to procedural due process. 
I t was only in Bachan Singh's case when the scope 
of substantive due process was recognized. This time the 
*prodecure* was Interpreted as including both siibstantive 
and procedural due process . l t was r ightly observed that 
the substantive and procedural portions of law affect ing 
deprivation are so inseparable that both must stand the 
t e s t of reasonableness, fairness and Justness. 
This means that Gopalan's case was wrongly decided. 
The law challenged in that case should have been tes ted 
with reference to Art. 19(1) (d) . 
In short* Art. 19 now bids f a i r t o be the due pro> 
cess clauseof the Indian const i tut ion. As early as 1956 
in Mysore University Extension Lecture on "Ihe Legal 
p i l l a r s of our Democracy* Prof. O.C. Venkata Subbarao 
pointed out "Due process i s only a foxmula which enables 
the court to t e s t the reasonableness of laws made by the 
l eg i s la tnre . Art. 19 of our constitution confers upon our 
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courts the power of t e s t ing laws on the touchstone of 
reasonableness. That In ny humble opinion* Is our due 
process clause and t h e palladium of our l i b e r t i e s , * 
The recent decisions of the Sup rente Court thus 
represents a veritable watershed in the progressive 
and purposive evolution of const i tut ional doctrine by 
the interpretive process of the supreme court. 
In th i s work a humble attempt i s made to unfold 
the Judicial interpretation of procedure established 
by law. I have devoted special attention t o t h e numerous 
techniq[ues of interpretion developed by the Judiciary in 
tes t ing l eg i s la t ion on the touchstone of the const i tut ion. 
This, i t i s . hoped, w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the task to understand 
the reasoning given by court. 
In th i s votk. f i r s t chapter deals with the origin 
and meaning at the phrase 'due process' evolved by various 
cases* 
Second chapter deals with what i s the concept of 
due process in Anerican constitution* how i t was adopted 
and what were the reasons for i t s adoption. 
In third chapter I have made the f u l l e s t use of 
the constituent Ass«nbly Debates s o that the basic 
intent ions of the founding fathers may be prominently 
borne in mind in following up the subsequent legal deve-
lOfxaents. I t records how the words'* due process" were 
substituted for the phrase'procedure established by 
law' . 
In fourth chapter I have dealt with Gopalan's case* 
In t h i s chapter I have discussed* how the majority favou-
red the s t r i c t and l i t e r a l intei^pretation of Art. 21. The 
court 's approach was very negative and i4nfluenced by 
imperative theory of law. The court's attitude however, 
somewhat l ibera l i sed in Bank Nationalization case. 
But the pos i t i ve and l ibera l interpretation of 
Art 21 was followed in Maneka Gandhi's case. This time 
Art 21 was interpreted very widely and the procedural 
safeuard was included in Art 21, I t was only in Bachan 
Singh's case when Art 21 was interpreted to include 
procedural as well as sxibstantive safeguard, and t h i s 
has been discussed in Chapter f i f t h . 
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CHAPTER - I 
MEANING OF THE PHRASE *IXJE PR0CB8S* 
Due process clauses are found in U.S. Constitution 
5th aeendnent of the U.S. constittxtlon provides inter 
alia# 
**Mo person shall be deprived of h i s l i f e* l iberty 
or property without due process of law**. 
Another due process clause i s found in the 14th 
t« which lays down inter alia* 
"No state shall deprive any person of l i f e l iberty 
^nd property* without due process of law". 
The fozmer i s pertaining to the federal government 
and the l a t t e r protects persons from state action. There 
are two aspects % Procedural in which a person i s guarant. 
eed fa i r procedures and the second i s substantive which 
protects a persotfs property from unfair governmental 
interference or taking.s imilar clauses are in most state 
const i tut ions . 
What *due process of law* exactly means* i s d i f f i -
cult to define even at the present day. The constitution 
contains no description of what i s *due process of law** 
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nor does i t declare the pr iac iples by application of ^dilch 
I t could be ascertained. In Twipnina V. Hew Jersey , the 
court observed! 
"Few phrases in the law are so elusive o£ 
exact apprehension as t h i s . This court has always 
declined to give a cemprehensive definit ion of i t 
and has preferred that i t s fu l l meaning should be 
gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion 
and exclusion in the course of the decisions of 
cases as they arise". 
Black's law dictionary defines 'Due process of law* 
as law in i t s regxilar course of aokninistration through 
covirts of Just ice . Diie process of law in each particular 
case means such an exercise of the powers of the govt, as 
the s e t t l e d maxims of law permit and sanction, and tinder 
such safe guards for the protection of individual rights 
as those maxims prescribe for the c lass of cases t o %^ich 
the one in question belongs* A course of legal proceedings 
according to those rules and principles which have been 
establ ished in American systems of Jurisprudence for 
the enforcement and protection of private r ights . To 
give such proceedings any va l id i ty , there must be a t r i -
bunal oompet^t by i t s constitution that i s , by the law 
1. 211 U.S. 79 
12 
Of i t s creation - to pass upon the subject matter of the 
su i t ; and i f that involves merely a determination of the 
personal l i a b i l i t y of the defendant* he must be brought 
within i t s jurisdict ion by service of process within the 
2 
s ta te , or his voluntary appearance. 
Due process of law implies the right of the person 
affected thereby to be present before the tribunal which 
pronounces Judgement upon the question of l i f e , l iberty , 
or property in i t s most cwnprehensive sense; to be heard, 
by testimony or otherwise, and t o have the right of 
controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears 
on the question of right in the matter Involved. If any 
qiiestion of fact or l i a b i l i t y be conclusively presumed 
3 
against him, th i s i s not due process of law. 
An orderly proceeding wherein a person i s served 
with not ice , actual or constructive, and has an oppor-
tunity t o be heard and to enforce and protect h i s rights 
before a court having power to hear and determine the 
case • 
Phrase means that no person shal l be deprived of 
l i f e , l iberty , property or of any right granted him 
2. Pennoyer V. Neff, 95 U.S.733, 24 L.Ed. 565 
3. Black's law Dictionary. 
.KazUboWski V. KazubQWski, 45 H i . 2 d 405, 259N.E.2d2e2, 290. 
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by statue^ un le s s matter involved f i r s t s h a l l have been 
adjudicated against him upon t r i a l conducted according 
t o e s t a b l i s h e d ru les regulat ing J u d i c i a l proceedings» 
5 
and i t £orbids condemnation without a hear ing . 
The c o n c ^ t of "due process of law" as i t i s 
embodied in f i f t h amendment demands t h a t a law sha l l 
not be unreasonable/ arbi trary , or capr i c ious and that 
the means s e l e c t e d s h a l l have a reasonable and substan-
t i a l r e l a t i o n t o t h e objec t being sought* 
Fundamental r e q u i s i t e of "due process" i s the 
opportunity t o be heard* t o be aware t h a t a matter i s 
pending* t o make an informed choice whether t o acquiesce 
or contest* and t o asseckbefore the appropriate decis ion 
7 
making-body the reasons f o r such c h o i c e . 
The e s s e n t i a l el^nent of due process of law are 
n o t i c e and opportunity t o be heard and t o defend in 
orderly . Proceeding adapted t o nature of case* and t h e 
guarantee of due process requires t h a t every man have 
Q 
p r o t e c t i o n of day in court and b e n e f i t of general law. 
5. P e t t i t V. Pann. La. A D P . . ISOSO 2d 66.69 
6 . U.S.V, atnith. D.C. Iowa. 249 F.Supp. 515.516 
7. Trinitiv Eoiacopal Corp V. Pomnev* DC.S.Y.. 3 8 7 F . S U P P 
1044 
8 . Pi Maio V. Reid* 132 N.J .L . 17*37 A. 2d 829*830. 
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Daniel Webster def ined t h i s phrase t o mean a 
law which hears before i t condemns* which proceeds on 
inquiry and renders Judgement only a f t e r t r i a l . 
This c lause has been the most s i g n i f i c a n t s i n g l e 
source of J u d i c i a l review in USA. The word "due" i s i n t e r -
preted as •Just* , •proper* or •reasonable* according t o 
J u d i c i a l view. The court may declare a law i n v a l i d i f 
i t does not accord %dth i t s notion of what i s Just and 
f a i r in t h e c ircumstances . 
TWO ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS I 
There are two aspect of due p r o c e s s . 
(1) Procedural Due Process i» 
Those safeguards t o o n e ' s l i b e r t y and property 
mandated by the 14th Amend., U.S. Cbnst.« such as the 
r ight t o counsel appointed for one ytio i s ind igent , t h e 
r ight t o a copy of a t r a n s c r i p t , the r i g h t of confron-
t a t i o n . 
Central meaning of procedural due process i s 
t h a t p a r t i e s whose r i g h t s are tobe a f f e c t e d are e n t i t l e d 
to be heard and, in order tha t they may enjoy that r i g h t . 
15 
9 they must be n o t i f i e d * 
(2) Substant ive Dua Process $-
Such may be broadly defined as t h e oonst i tx i t ional 
guarantee t h a t no person s h a l l be a r b i t r a r i l y deprived 
of h i s l i f e * l i b e r t y or property; the e s sence o f subs-
t a n t i v e due process i s p r o t e c t i o n from arbi trary and 
unreasonable a c t i o n . 
9 . Parham V. Cortese, 407 US.67,92 S.Ct. 1983,1994,32 L. 
Ed 2d 556. _ _ _ « _ _ _ « _ 
10. Babineau . X V. Judic iary ccraroission. La, 341 So 2d 
396, 400. 
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ORIGIN OF THE WORDS "DPE PROCESS* 
Because the Barons of England were not v i g i l a n t * 
they were subject t o g r e a t tyranny by king John. As t i m e 
passed* they rea l i s ed that the vo i ce s of l i b e r t y could 
not be route for a l l t i m e . They r e a l i s e d that t h e t r e e 
of l i b e r t y must be refreshed from time t o t ime %«ith the 
blood of patr io t i sm and t o l e r a n c e . I t i s a natural 
manure. Therefore* in t h e year 1215* Saxons of England 
at t h e b a t t l e of Runnymede wrung concess ions from king 
John* which came t o be embodied in Magna Carta# the 
great charter o f l i b e r t i e s * the bedrock o f a l l freedoms. 
The words "due process" have been traced t o t h e 
famous words of Hagna Carta. 
"No free man s h a l l be taken or imprisoned or 
or d i s s e i z e d o r outlawed or e x i l e d or in anyway 
destroyed; nor s h a l l we go upon him nor send upon him 
but by t h e lawful Judgonent of h i s peers and by t h e law 
of the land".^ 
Magna Carta as a charter of Engl ish l i b e r t y was 
confirmed by succes s ive Engl ish monarch and i t i s one 
of these confirmations known as ' S t a t u t e of Westaainlster 
of t h e l i b e r t i e s of London* that the express ion 'due 
1. 39th Chapter of Magna Carta^ 
17 
piocess of law* for the f i r s t time appears in the follow-
ing clause. 
"That no man of what estate or condition shall be 
put out of land or tenement nor taken, nor imprisj^ed 
nor disinherited nor put to death without being brought 
2 in answer by due process of the law." 
That expression had i t s roots in the expression 
'Per legem terrae* (law of the land) used in Magna 
Carta. 
In Peti t ion of Right the violat ion of t h i s statute 
was urged by averring that contrary to the statute* peo-
ple had been arrested and detained withoixt any cause 
3 
shown other than the order of the king. 
I t i s clear that "due process of the law" in 
Sngland conveyed the idea of arrest or inprisbnment 
according to the law of the land« as opposed to the 
arbitrary orders of the king or h is council* and the 
procedural safeguards considered necessary in the United 
States were not a necessary part of the concept in England . 
In England i t i s applied only as protection against 
executive usurpation and royal tyranny. 
2. 28> Edw. I l l Ch.3. 
3. c i s . IV and V of the Petit ion of Right. 
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CHAPTER - I I 
DUE PROCESS IN THE AMERICAN OONSTITUTIOW 
Concept Of Due Process came In to America as part 
of the r i g h t s of Englishmen claimed by the c o l o n i s t . 
Framers of t h e American c o n s t i t u t i o n did not put 
the "Due Process" c lause in to the o r i g i n a l document* 
The c lause was included in the b i l l of r i g h t s and appears 
in the f i f t h Amendment adopted in 1791 as a l i m i t a t i o n 
upon the federal power. I t provided t h a t . 
"No person s h a l l be deprived of l i f e * l i b e r t y 
or property without due process o£ law." 
A s i m i l a r l i m i t a t i o n upon the s t a t e s was introduced 
by the adoption of the Fourteenth Mnendment in 1868. 
DUE PROCESS AS A RESTRAINT ON LEGISLATIVE POWER 
The reqxiirement of *due process of law* in the 
United States constitution inpl ies a l imitat ion upon 
a l l the powers of Government, l e g i s l a t i v e as well as 
executive and Judicial . In England i t i s applied only 
as protection against executive usurpation and royal 
tyrdhliy. In America i t became a bulwark against arbi> 
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trary l e g l s l a t i w i . I t i s a restraint upon the l e g i s l a t i v e 
powers. 
The f i r s t case in which the supreme count of the 
United States considered the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment was Murray's Lessee V. Hobcken Land & 
Improvement Co« 
The co l lector of the Port of New York had been 
found to owe the United States a large sum of money. In 
order to recovert th i s debt, the s o l i c i t o r of the treasuxy« 
by virtue of an act of congress^ ordered a federal marshall 
to s e l l the property for the co l l ec tor . The question was 
whether the property could be proceeded against in that 
way though the proceduxe was sanctioned by l e g i s l a t i v e 
enactment. Mr. Just ice Curtis observed as followst 
"That the warrant now in question i s legal process, 
i s not denied. . . - . - But i s i t "Due Process of 
Law?" The constitution contains no description 
of those processes which i t was intended to allow 
or forbid. I t does not even declare what principles 
are to be applied to ascertain whether i t be due 
process. I t i s manifest that i t was not l e f t to 
1. (1856) 18 How. 272 
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the l e g i s l a t i v e power to enact any process v^lch 
mig^t be devised. The a r t i c l e i s a r e s t r a i n t on 
the legi3 l a t i v e as well as on t he executive and 
J u d i c i a l powers of the government, and can not 
be so construed as t o leave congress free to 
make any process "due process of law"* by i t s 
mere w i l l . To what p r inc ip le* then* are we to 
r e s o r t to a sce r t a in Ae ther t h i s process* enacted 
by congress* i s due process? To t h i s the answer 
must be twofold. We must examine the cons t i tu t ion 
i t s e l f* to see whether t h i s process be in con f l i c t 
with any of i t s p rov i s ions . I f not found to be so* 
we must lock to those s e t t l e d usages and modes of 
proceeding e x i s t i n g in the ccranon and statt trelaw 
of England, before the emigration of our ancestors* 
and v^ich are shown not t o have been unsuited to 
t h e i r c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l condition by having been 
enacted on by them a f t e r the se t t lement of t h i s 
country •• 
I t was held t h a t t e s t e d by the conmon law of England 
the proceedings authorised by the Act could not be denied 
to be due process of law. In t h i s case* the court departed 
from the meaning of due process as understood in England 
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and he ld that i t operated as a l i m i t a t i o n not only on 
the execut ive but on the l e g i s l a t u r e as w e l l . The o b j e c t 
i s t o p r o t e c t t h e c i t i z e n s against arb i trary and capri -
c ious l e g i s l a t i o n . Hence, i t i s not wi th in the ccntpetence 
of the Congress to make any process a 'due process of law* 
by i t s mere w i l l * for t h a t would make the l i m i t a t i o n 
qui te nugatory. I t i s not any act l e g i s l a t i v e in form 
that i s law« law i s something more than a mere w i l l , 
exerted as an act of power. I t means and s i g n i f i e s the 
general law of the land, tiie s e t t l e d and abiding p r i n c i -
p l e s which inhere , in the c o n s t i t u t i o n and l i e at the 
root of the e n t i r e l e g a l system. 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS » 
In t h e case of Murray's d ie process was regarded 
as a l i m i t a t i o n on procedure rather than on the substeuice 
of l e g i s l a t i v e content . The reqtiirement of due process was 
deemed to be s a t i s f i e d so long as the manner of detenni -
ning ind iv idua l r ight s was f a i r and sound. I t i s v i o l a t e d 
when the general law i s deviated from. A general law, in 
the f e l i c i t o u s words of Daniel Webster in h i s argument 
2 
in the Dartmout College Case i s "a law which hears befOBB 
i t condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry , and renders 
judgement only a f t e r t r i a l . The meaning i s , that every 
2. I?artP»9uth c o l l e g e V.Woodward. 1819. 4 Wh^.fnn mft-Ai. «>, 
629. 
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ci t izen shall hold his l i f e , l iberty and property and 
immunities under the protection of the general xules 
which govern society". This conc^t of due process pres-
cribes that l eg i s la t ion involving the taking of l i f e or 
property must do Hie taking in confozmity with accustomed 
legal fozms and pract ices . Due process i s , thus at once 
a principle of law -> making and a principle of Judicial 
construction where the const i tut ional i ty of a law i s im-
pugned in the courts. I t guaranteed certain protective 
rights t o an accused person before he could be deprived 
of his l i f e , l iberty or property. I t s importance in cr i -
minal cases i s thus manifest. I t promised accused persons 
that they would not be punished in an arbitrary and indi»> 
criminate fashion and vouchsafed than the protection of 
long established criminal procedure. I t thus l imited the 
manner, though not the stibstance, of governmental action. 
The meaning of the expression 'due process of law' 
has not a def inite connotation. I t expresses a very e la s -
t i c conception. The best description of the expression 
would be, in each part icular case such an exercise of 
the powers of Government as the se t t l ed maxims of law 
permit and sanction. Under such safeguards for the pro-
tection of individual rights as those maxims prescribe 
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for t h e c l a s s of cases t o which the one in quest ion 
b e l o n g s . 
In s p i t e of the i n d e f i t e n e s s of the expressicn 
*due proces s o f law* i n the American Cons t i tu t ion , 
Prof. Wi l l s in h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l law of t h e United 
s t a t e s (1936) po in t s out a t P662 that *due process ' as a 
matter of procedure requires cer ta in inherent elements of 
J u s t i c e in the determination of ques t ions rahter than 
t h a t any cer ta in form be used in a r r i v i n g at the dec i -
s i o n . He po ints out t h a t as recogni t ion of t h i s , were 
developed as the modem e s s e n t i a l s of due process - — — -
(1) N o t i c e ; 
(2) Opportunity, to be heard; 
(3) an impart ia l t r i b u n a l ; and 
(4) an orderly course of procedure. 
Thus i t could be summed up as the process which 
i s due under jus naturalet p r i n c i p l e s of natural j u s t i c e . 
The two corner s tones aret 
(1) Audi alterem Partem (Hear the o ther s ide ) 
(2) Nemo Judex non causa Sua 
(No person can be both a Judge and a prosecutor) 
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When Madison wrote the 'due process* c lause Into 
h i s f i r s t draft of the B i l l of Rights« he thought of 
due process only as a procedural gurantee . His view was 
doubt less tha t esqpressed by Hamilton in 1787 on a New 
York law which contained p r o v i s i o n s guaranteeing that 
no one should be deprived of s p e c i f i e d r i g h t s except 
by •due process of law*. This apparently was the f i r s t 
American enactment (Save a 1692 Massachusetts s ta tu te ) 
t o s u b s t i t u t e 'due process of law' for the*law of the land* 
phraseology o r i g i n a l l y derived from Magna Carta. "The 
words 'due process ' have a p r e c i s * t e c h n i c a l import, and 
are only applicable t o the process and proceedings of 
the courts of j u s t i c e ; they can never be ref«rred t o an 
act of the l e g i s l a t u r e " sa id Hamilton, 
Due process had never been def ined prec i se ly* but 
I t was a s s o c i a t e d g e n e r a l l y with procedural r ights ."The 
generat ion that fought t h e c i v i l war u s u a l l y i d e n t i f i e d 
3 
due proces s with common law procedure". The framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment* too* thought tha t due process 
of law had "the customary meaning recognized by the counts 
4 
which was unquestionably procedural . 
3. Shar lesM Hou5^* "Due Process of Law»TDday<"Harvard Law 
— HPVIPW. Vol 1? ii^ihSih L tttti 
4 . ^ o s e n h a. Jamea. The framing of the fourteePth Aaiendtoeot 
(Uri>onai Univers i ty of I l l i n o i s Presa^ 19Sg) pp eg>87 
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SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Before 1850 due pxocess was g e n e r a l l y assvonecl 
t o be a procedural rather than a sxibstantlve r e s t z i -
ctloD upon govemnental author i ty . When t h e p r o t e c t i o n 
of the c o n s t i t u t i o n had t o be invoked for i n v a l i d a t i n g 
l e g i s l a t i v e act ion encroaching upon proprie tary right:s 
and v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s * A r t i c l e 1* Sec t ion 10 of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n r e l a t i n g t o the "obl igat ion of contract" 
c lause used t o be pressed i n t o s e r v i c e . This "contract 
c lause" was s u c c e s s f u l l y invoked in F le tcher V Peck 
t o s t r i k e down a l e g i s l a t i v e enactment of the s t a t e of 
Georgia. The l e g i s l a t u r e of t h a t s t a t e in 1795 made a 
grant of certa in p u b l i c xands t o James Ounn. This 
grant was obtained by bribing a l l the l e g i s l a t o r s . The 
property passed through several hands. In 1796 t h e 
Act of 1795 was repealed on t h e ground that i t s pass** 
age had been obtained by bribery of t h e l e g i s l a t o r s . 
The v a l i d i t y of the l a t t e r Act was quest ioned. Marshall» 
C.J . h e l d i 
"A law annulling conveyances between i n d i v i d u a l s and 
declaring t h a t t h e grantors should stand se i zed of t h e i r 
former e s t a t e s , notwithstanding those grants* would 
5 . (1810) 6 Cranch 87 • 3LEd. 162. 
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be as repugnant t o the c o n s t i t u t i o n , as a law 
discharging the vendors of property from the 
ob l iga t ion of execut ing t h e i r contrac t s by 
conveyances, * 
In Terret t V. Tavlor a l e g i s l a t i v e enactment e f 
the s t a t e of Virg in ia attempting t o take t i t l e t o c e r -
t a i n lands of the d i s e s t a b l i s h e d Bpiscopal Church was 
struck down by J u s t i c e s t o r y who held t h a t the contract 
c lause iiqposed r e s t r i c t i o n s upon the s t a t e s l e g i s l a t i v e 
a u t h o r i t y , 
7 
In Dartmouth Col lege V Woodword , by an Act of 
l e g i s l a t u r e of New Hampshire passed i n 1816 t h e mana« 
gcnent and ^ p l i c a t i o n of the funds of a re l ig io is i and 
l i t e r a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s # which were p laced by t h e donors 
in the hands of t r u s t e e named in the c h a r t e r s , and 
empowered t o perpetuate thepnselves* were placed by 
t h a t Act \ander t h e contro l of t h e government of the 
s t a t e . The w i l l of t h e s t a t e was s u b s t i t u t e d for t h e 
w i l l o f the donors, in every e s s e n t i a l operation o f 
t h e c o l l e g e . I t was held t h a t the Act was "Subversive 
of t h a t contract , on the f a i t h of which property was 
given "by the donors t o the i n s t i t u t i o n , 
6. (1815) 9 Cronch 43 
7. (1819) 4 Wheaton 518 « 4 LEd. 629. 
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The early American Judges* both Federal and States* 
appealed to natural rights t o the socia l contract as 
l imit ing governmental powers* even apart frcm any 
esqpress constitutional res tr ic t ions such as the con-
tract clause. In th i s sense* the different constitutions 
were treated as declaratory of natural law* and hence 
as embodiments of universal precepts that were the root 
of a l l const i tut ions . 
"Though there may be no prohibition In the cons-
t i tu t ion* argued Danial Webetor in 1829* "the l e g i s -
lature i s restrained from committing flagrant acts* 
fxom acts subverting the great principles of republics 
l i b e r t y , and of the social compact". The very nature of 
soc ie ty and of government prescribed essent ia l l imits 
upon l e g i s l a t i v e power. Those l imi ts according to a 
New York decision in 1^49 rested upon the broader and 
more so l id ground of natural rights and were not wholly 
dependent upon these negatives* contained in the cons-
t i t u t i o n . " 
Meanwhile the const i tut ional focus was soon to 
s h i f t fron natural law theories to the esgpress l indta-
t ions contained in the due process c lause. This was 
primarily the result of several s ta te Court decisions 
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during the pre -c iv i l war period, notably those of 
the New York Court of Appeals .The New York cases ref-
lected a steady development of the notion that the 
rights of the individual were protected by due process 
from a substantive, as well as procedural, point of 
view. That development culminated in the celebrated 
case of Wvnehamer V. New York, 
The case arose out of a New York law that prohi-
bited the sale of intoxicating liquors except for medi-
c inal purposes and the storage of l iquors and not inten-
ded for sale in any place but a dwelling house. The law 
further provided for the immediate sximmary destruction 
of a l l liquors held in violat ion of i t s provisions. I t 
also made any violat ion misdemeanour. 
In th i s notable case, a s ta te law regulating the 
manufacture of liquor was held inval id on the ground 
that i t violated the due process clause in the s tate 
const i tut ion . The s tate court noted that th i s clause 
was to be viewed as a general res tr ic t ion on the power 
of the state l eg i s la ture to interfere w i t h private 
property, 
8 , 13 NY 378 (1856). 
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The great s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s case was the 
New York court used substant ive due process as a 
subst i txj te for the natural law approach. 
The Wynehamer dec i s ion was recognised as epoch 
making almost as soon as i t was rendered. The reason-
ing of Wynehamer court* p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s s u b s t i t u t i o n 
of substant ive due process as a check upon arbi trary 
goveimmental power for the p r i o r natural law approiach 
was t o be t h a t xi l t imately adopted by American courts# 
inc luding the h ighes t bench in t h e land a f t e r r a t i -
f i c a t i o n of the fourteenth Anendment« 
I t became a magnif icent task f o r the supreme 
court of the United S t a t e s to g ive meaning and l i f e 
t o t h i s phrase and make i t v ibrant . 
In the words of Alex i s De Tooaue V i l l e . 
"The Supreme Court i s p laced higher than any known 
t r i b u n a l . The peace, the prosper i ty and very 
e x i s t e n c e of t h e union are ves t ed in the hands 
of the seven Federal Judges'*. 
In the ear ly years of i t s h i s t o r y , u n t i l about 
1850, the Due Process Clause was in terpre ted as p r o t e c t i n g 
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against unfair procedures only and not against the 
substance of l e g i s l a t i o n . In otherwords, i t was 
construed as being merely a procedural rather than 
a substantive restr ict ion upon governmental action. 
I t guaranteed certain protective rights t o an 
accused person beford he could be deprived of his l i fe* 
l iberty or property. These rights Included. 
(1) Protection against arrest without warrant* 
(11)right to counsel. 
( i l l ) t h e requirement of indictment . by a grant jury 
before t r i a l , 
(Iv) the right of the accused to hear the nature of 
the evidence against him* 
(v) the right to an impartial Jury of the accused 
person^ pears* and 
(vi) the requirement of a verdict before any sentence 
was executed. 
Due process of law h i s tor i ca l l y was of s ign i f i e s 
ance primarily in criminal cases . 
The Supreme Court began giving due pzocess a 
substantive content* using i t to inval idate s tate 
action Interfering with individual freedoms. I t was a 
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period of Increasing url^anlsatlon and burgeoning indus-
t r i a l i s a t i o n . This gave r ise to complex social and 
eoonoralc problems. The leg i s la tures responded by passing 
a s e t l e s of l eg i s la t ion to regulate private property 
in the in teres t s of public welfare. The judiciary 
responded by creating and wielding the sword of subs-
tantive due process. Acting as a kind of super l e g i s -
lature or a "negative third Chamber" the supreme court* 
reviewed scores of s ta te and federal* Social* and Scons-
mic l eg i s la t ion and struck them down as being vio lat ive 
of substantive due process. "Reasonableness" became the 
Keyword. Legislation which passed the court's t e s t of 
reasonableness was upheld. The problem however, was 
that the court possessed no accurate yardstick to 
measure's 'reasonableness*. There was no handy external 
measuring standard. There was no handy speci f ic const i -
tut ional provision or absolute principle of law. The 
court therefore, used a subjective approach making doe 
process a fluid, f l ex ib le and sometimes aebulous 
concept. Obviously t h i s provoked much criticisms 
A reasonable law was one that seemed sensi -
ble , plausible, and i n t e l l i g e n t to the judges 
wo passed upon I t . What can constitute sensible . 
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plausible and i n t e l l i g e n t public pol icy, however, 
i s largely a matter of the individuals economic 
and social philosophy his standard of values. When 
the court applied the t e s t of reasonableness to 
l eg i s l a t i on , i t measured the law against i t s 
own econonic and social a t t i tudes . If in the 
l ight of these att i tudes , the law seamed inte -
l l i g e n t , the Just ices upheld i t , i f not, they 
declared i t unreasonable, arbitrary and a viola* 
tion of due process of law. There was often a 
9 
capricious element in such Judgement. 
In e f fec t , the court v^en i t invalidated l e g i s -
la t ion as being v io lat ive of due process, was substi-
tuting i t s own social and economic philosophy for that 
of the l eg i s la ture . I n i t i a l l y the court followed a 
l a i s s e s faire philosophy, severely curtail ing the 
regulatory power of the state in the interest of 
freedom of contract and business growth free of govern-
mental interference. 
In Lochner V New York , the court invalidated 
a New York statute regulating hours of labour of bakers. 
The statuteplaced a maximtun l imit of s ixty hours of 
9. The American const i tut ion. I t s origins and develop-
ment — — — — ^ — — — — 
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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labour in one week or ten hours in any one day. I t was 
a 5-4 decision* with the majority fee l ing that the 
statute exceeded the permissible l imi t s o£ state regu-
latory power and would result an intolerable impairment 
of the freedom of contract. Just ice Holmes dissenting 
opinion i s of importance not only for i t s e f fect ive 
attack upon the l a i s s e z faire approach used by the 
court# but because the principles enunciated therein 
were la ter adopted by the court. Just ice Holmes wrotet 
"This case i s decided upon an economic 
theory which a large part of the country does 
not entertain a constitution i s 
not intended to embody a particular economic 
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic 
relation of the c i t i zen to the s tate or of l a i s sez 
fa ire . I t made for people of fundamentally diff-
ering views, and the accident of our finding 
certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel 
and even shocking, ought not be concJude our 
judgement upon the question whether statutes 
embodying them conf l ic t with the constitution 
of the united States ." 
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Adoption of Just ice Holme's views led to an 
era of j i d i c i a l se l f restraint in the years between 
1937 and 1953. Sxibstantive due process was no longer 
used by the court to curb state economic l e g i s l a t i o n . 
However substantive due process did remain a l ive and 
well in the area of c i v i l l i b e r t i e s . 
After 19 53 the Warren Court launched into an 
era of Judicial activism* breathing l i f e into the 
concept of svibstantive due process and using i t with 
renewed v i t a l i t y . There was« however* a great d i f fere-
nce in the way i t was being used. The tool was s t i l l 
'Substantive due process ' , but In the hands of the 
Warren court i t s accomplished ends dramatically d i f f e -
rent from those of the conservatives of lochner era. 
This reveals what a powerful concept sxibstantive 
due process i s what a dangexous double edged sword i t 
can be since i t can be used both to e3q>and the guaran-
tees of individual rights as well as t o cut back on 
them. 
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CaiAPTER " I I I 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ART 21 VIZ DRAFT 
ART. 15 . 
Draf t Art. 15 as o r i g i n a l l y p a s s e d by t h e Cons-
t i t u e n t Assembly, p r o v i d e d t h a t "No person s h a l l be 
d e p r i v e d of h i s l i f e o r l i b e r t y w i t h o u t due p r o c e s s 
o f l a w . " The D r a f t i n g committee s u g g e s t e d two changes 
in t h i s A r t i c l e . 
( i ) t h e a d d i t i o n o f t h e word " p e r s o n a l " b e f o r e t h e 
word " l i b e r t y " and 
( i i } t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f t h e esqpression "except a c c o r -
d ing t o p r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d by law" f o r t h e 
words "wi thout due p r o c e s s o f law". 
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF'DUE PROCESS* 
Mr. Kazi Syed Karimuddin opposed t h e s e amendments 
and s a i d i f the proposed amendment by t h e D r a f t i n g 
Committee was a c c e p t e d and a r t i c l e was a l lowed t o s t a n d 
1 
a s 
"No person s h a l l be d e p r i v e d o f h i s l i f e or p e r -
s o n a l l i b e r t y e x c e p t a c c o r d i n g t o procedure e s t a b l i s h -
ed by l a w — " 
1 . CAD Volume V l l t h 1948»49 p . 8 4 2 - 8 4 3 . 
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Then in his opinion i t would open a sad chapter 
in the history of constitutional law. He supported the 
suggestion of the Advisory Committee on Fundamental 
Rights appointed by the constituent Assembly that no 
person shall be deprived of his l i f e or l iberty with-
out due process of law; and he real ly did not under-
stand how the words "personal and according t o proce-
dure established by law had been brought into a r t i c l e 
15 by the Draft committee. 
He further argued i f the words "according to 
procedure established by law" are enacted* there w i l l 
be very great in jus t i ce to the law courts in the country, 
because as soon as a procedure according to law i s com-
pl ied with by a court, there wi l l be an end to the 
duties of the courts and i f the court i s sa t i s f i ed that 
the procedure has been complied with, then the Judges 
can not Interfere with any law which might have been 
coprieious, unjust or iniquitous. He wanted to provide 
guarantee to individuals inalienable rights in such a 
way that the p o l i t i c a l parties that come into power can 
not extend the ir jurisdict ion 'in curtai l ing and invading 
the fundamental rights la id down in the const i tut ion. 
Therefore, he submitted that the words "except according 
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t o procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law" be de le ted and then that 
the words "without due process of law" be i n s e r t e d , 
Mr. Mahbxib Al i Baiq Sahib Bahadur moved "that 
i n a r t i c l e 15 f o r the words "except according t o proce-
dure e s tab l i shed by law" the words, "save in accordance 
with law" be s u b s t i t u t e d . " ^ 
In t h e note given by the Draft ing committee i t 
was s t a t e d that they made two changes. The f i r s t i s 
the in s er t i on o f the word 'personal* before l iberty*and 
the reason given i s that un le s s t h i s woxd personal f inds 
a p l a c e there , the c lause may be construed very widely 
so as t o include even the freedoms already dea l t with 
i n art . 13. 
As regards why the o r i g i n a l words "without due 
process of law" were omitted and the present words 
"except according t o procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law" are 
i n s e r t e d , the reason i s s ta ted t o be t h a t the express ion 
i s more d e f i n i t e and such a prov i s ion f inds p lace in 
Art. 31 of the Japanese Const i tut ion of 1946. 
Mr. Mahboob Al i argued, "It i s no doubt true 
tha t in Japanese c o n s t i t u t i o n ar t . 31 reads l i k e t h i s 
2 . CAD Vol. VII 1948-49 p 844. 
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but i f the other ar t i c l e s that find place in the Japa-
nese constitution (VIZ, Arts. 32,34 and 35) had a l so been 
incorporated in t h i s Draft constitution that would have 
been a complete safeguarding of the personal l iber ty of 
the c i t i z e n . This Draft constitution has conveniently 
emitted those provis ions." Art. 32 of the Japanese consti-
tution provides that "no person shal l be denied the right 
of access to the court," According to present expression 
i t may be argued that the l eg i s la ture might pass a law 
that a person w i l l have no right to go to a court of law 
t o establ ish his innocence. But according to the Japanese 
constitution art. 32 c learly says that "no person shall 
be denied the right of access to the court. But there i s 
no such a corresponding provision in the Draft const i tu-
t i o n . 
Art. 34 of the Japanese constitution provides that 
"No person shall be arrested or detained without being 
at once informed of the charges against him or withcwt 
the immediate pr iv i l ege of counsel, nor shall be detained 
without adequate cause and upon demand of any such person 
such cause shoulc^ be inmediately shown in open court in 
his presence and in the presence of his couneel." Such 
a c lear right has not been given in these draft provisions. 
3, Id at p 844. 
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Fuirther Art 35. provides that the right of a l l 
persons to be secured in the ir homes and against entry* 
searches e tc . shall not be impaired, except upon warrant 
issued only for probable cause and so on. If for the 
sake of c lar i ty and deflJiitenoBs the Draft constitution 
a r t i c l e bad imported Art. 31 of the Japanese const i -
tut ion i t should in fairness have Incorporated the other 
a r t i c l e s of the Japanese const i tut ion, which are relevf^nt 
and which were enacted for safeguarding the personal 
l iber ty of the honest c i t i z e n . 
4 
Mr, Mahboob Ali argued that the expression "ex-
cept according to procedure established by law* covers 
the point but the expression means "procedure established 
by law" of the l eg i s la ture and i t w i l l competent for 
the leg is lature to lay down a provision that in the 
matter of detention of person whether for p o l i t i c a l or 
other reasons# the jurisdict ion of the court i s ousted. 
The only extent to which the courts can go i s t o find out 
whether there i s bonafides or mala fides for the action 
of the government/ and the burden i s la id upon the person 
t o prove that there i s mala f ides on the part of the 
government in having issued a warrant of detention or 
arrest . Therefore the words "except according to pro-
4. I(? flt? p, 845 
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cedure l a i d down by law" would mean and according t o 
him i t does mean# t h a t the future l e g i s l a t u r e might 
pass a law by which the r ight of a c i t i z e n t o be t r i e d 
by a court t o e s t a b l i s h h i s innocence could be taken 
away. I f the words "except according t o procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d by law" do not deprive a person of h i s r ight 
t o go before the court and e s t a b l i s h h i s innocence and 
he i s not prevented from such a course , then i t w i l l be 
another matter . But the words "without due process of 
law" have been held in England and other countr ies t o 
convey the meaning that every c i t i z e n has got the right* 
when an action has been taken, aga ins t him depriving him 
of h i s personal l i b e r t y , t o go be fore the court and say 
t h a t he i s innocent . Itiat r ight i s given under the expre-
s s i o n "without due process of law" or "save in accoi> 
dance with law". 
The express ion except according t o procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d by law" was objected on the above grounds, 
5 
Pandit Thakur Das Bharqava a l s o supported the 
express ion "without due process of law" and de l ivered his 
arguments. 
He argued that by us ing the words "without due 
5. Id at P, 846_ 
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process of law" the courts may be authorised to go into 
the question of the substantive law as well as procedu-
ral law when an enactment i s e^  acted, the courts wi l l 
have right to go into the question whether a particular 
law enacted by parliament i s just or not, whether i t 
i s good or not, whether as a matter of fact i t protects 
the l i b e r t i e s of the people or not. If the supreme court 
comes to the conclusion that i t i s unconstitutional that 
the law i s unreasonable or unjust then in that case the 
courts wi l l hold the law to be such and that law wi l l 
not have any further e f fec t . 
As regards procedure a lso , i f any leg is lature takes 
i t into i t s head to divest i t s e l f of the ordinary rights 
of having a good procedural law in th i s country, to 
that extent the court wi l l be e n t i t l e d to say whether 
the procedure i s just or not. 
I t was argued by the drafting committee that the 
words 'due process of law* are not certain or c lear . In 
reply Pandit Thakur Das said that what i s the exact mean-
ing of the word morality put in t h i s const i tut ion, i s 
not clear, and many other words used in th i s constitution 
have an uncertain meaning. The words decency and morality 
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have not got a def in i te meaning. Therefore i f words 
"due process of law are carried they wi l l constitute the 
bed rode of our l i b e r t i e s . This w i l l be a magna carta. 
This i s only victory for the judiciary over the auto-
cracy of the l eg i s la ture . In fact two bulwarks are 
needed for our l i b e r t i e s . One i s the leg is lature and 
the other i s the judiciary. But even i f the leg i s la ture 
i s carried away by party sp ir i t and i s sometimes pani-
cky the judiciary w i l l save from the tyranny of the legis-
lature and the executive. 
Shri Chimanlal Shah also supported the expression 
*due process of law'. According to his argunent the 
words 'without due process of law' have been taken from 
the Anerlcan constitution and they have come to acquire 
a particular connotation. Ttiat connotation i s that in 
reviewing l e g i s l a t i o n , the court w i l l have power to see 
not only that the procedure i s followed, namely, that the 
warrant i s in accordance with law o r that the signature 
and the seal are there, but i t has a lso the power to see 
that the substantive provisions of law are fa ir and just and 
not unreasonable or oppressive or capricious or arbitrary. 
That means that the judiciary i s given power to review 
l e g i s l a t i o n . In America that kind of power which has been 
6. Id at p. 848 
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given to the judiciary undoubtedly led to an amount of 
conservative outlook on the part of the Judiciary and to 
uncertainty in l e g i s l a t i o n . But our ar t i c l e i s in two 
respects entirely different from the ar t i c l e in the 
American const i tut ion. In the American constitution the 
words are used in connection with l i f e , l iberty and prop-
erty . But in t h i s ar t i c l e the word property has been 
omitted, becaue on account of the use of th is word in 
the American constitution there has been a good deal of 
l i t i g a t i o n and uncertainty. There has been pract ica l ly 
no l i t i ga t ion and no uncertainty as regards the inter-
pretation of the words "due process of law* as applied 
to l i f e and l iber ty . 
Secondly the word personal has been added before 
l iberty and i t has been made 'personal liberty* to make 
i t c lear that th i s ar t i c l e does not refer t o any kind 
of l iber ty of contract or anything of that kind, but 
re lates only to l i f e and l iberty of person. Therefore 
i t would be wrong to say that the words 'due process of 
law are l i k e l y to lead to any uncertainty in l eg i s la t ion 
or unnecessary interference by the Judiciary in reviewing 
l e g i s l a t i o n . 
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Shrl Krishna Chandra Sharma also supported the 
7 
expression 'due process of law*. According to him t h i s 
a r t i c l e guarantees the personal l iber ty and l i f e of 
the c i t i z e n . In democratic l i f e , l iber ty i s guaranteed 
through law. Democracy means nothing except that instead 
of rule by an individual, whether a king or despot, or 
a multitude, we wi l l have the rule of the law. The term 
*due process of law' has a necessary limitation on the 
powers of the s ta t e , both executive and l e g i s l a t i v e . The 
doctrine implied by "without due process of law" has a 
long history in Anglo Jtaerlcan law. I t does not lay down 
a speci f ic zule of law but i t implies a fundamental prin-
c ip le of Jufelce. These words have nowhere defined either 
in the English constitution or in the American const i -
tution but the ir meaning can be traced through reading 
the various antecedents of th i s expression. What t h i s 
phrase means i s t o guarantee a fa i r t r i a l both in proce-
dure as well as in substance. The procedure should be in 
accordance with law and should be appealable to the 
of the community. I t a lso ensures 
c i v i l i s e d conscience/a fa ir t r i a l in substance, t h ^ 
i s to say, that substantive law i t s e l f should be just and 
appealable to the c i v i l i z e d conscience of the community, 
7, Id at p. 850 
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REASONS FOR SUBSTITUTING 
"PRDCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW* FOR 
"DUE PROCESS OF LAW*. 
Substantive due process and procedural due process 
were we l l e s t a b l i s h e d in t h e United S t a t e s , and though 
the concept of*due process ' was va)gue and f l e x i b l e i t 
was used to enforce certa in standards t o which according 
t o majority o f the Judges of the U.S. Supreme Court 
subs tant ive and procedural laws had t o conform. However, 
the abuse of substant ive due process by the U.S. Supr«ne 
court produced second thoughts , and "due process* was 
replaced by "procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law". This charge 
was the r e s u l t of a d i scuss ion which the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
advisor* S ir , B.N. Rao had with Mr. J u s t i c e Frankfurter 
of the U,s, Supreme Court. 
S i r B.N, Rau, the then const i t tat ional Advisor t o 
t h e c o n s t i t u e n t Assembly was advised by Mr.Just ice Frank-
f u r t e r of the U.S. Suprane Court Against adopting due 
process in the Indian c o n s t i t u t i o n . For the o r i g i n a l 
i n t e n t i o n of the makers of the American c o n s t i t u t i o n , 
according t o Frankfurter, was t o use due process as a 
procedural safeguard only . But t h e U.S. Supreme Court 
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enlarged i t in to a siibstantive safeguard also. That 
made the judicial reveiw, according t o Frankfurter, 
undemocratic; because the court could s t t ike down 
the policies of the government even by taking the 
stand that they wore substantively opposed to the 
provisions of the consti tution. Jus t ice Frankfurter 
af ter an i n i t i a l period of liberalism inherited from his 
professorship became a conservative as to t he scope 
of Judicial review. He became the principal advocate 
of judicial res t ra in t in resfpect of questions governed 
by legis la t ive pol ic ies and would rather res t r i c t judi-
c ia l review to procedural grounds. Sir B.N Rau also had 
a background of being a distinguished c iv i l servant before 
he became a High Court Judge. He was easi ly persuaded 
to Frankfurter 's views and advised the conAtuent Assembly 
to stJdDstitute the e3q>ression "according to procedure 
established by law" in place of expression "according 
to due process of law". 
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CHAPTER - IV 
INTERPRETATION OF PHRASE 
'PROCEDURE ESTABLISHg> BY LAW' 
IN GOPALAN CASE 
Art. 21 l a y s down that no person s h a l l be deprived 
of h i s l i f e or personal l i b e r t y except according t o 
procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law. 
This A r t i c l e employs t h e same language as Art i -
c l e 31 of the Japanese c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1946, which 
s t a t e d I 
"No person s h a l l be deprived of l i f e and l i b e r t y , 
nor s h a l l any o ther criminal penal ty be imposed except 
according t o procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law." 
I t i s a l s o akin t o the F i f th and Fourteenth 
Amendments of t h e U.S. Cons t i tu t ion . However, t h e 
phraseology there-under has a l so been h i t h e r t o i s 'due 
proces s of l aw' . For the f i r s t t ime , the question arose 
in Gopalan case as t o what e x a c t l y i s the meaning o f 
'procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' . 
The p e t i t i o n e r Gopalan moved the Supreme Court 
1. A.K. Gopalan V. Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 
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by a p e t i t i o n under Art. 32. of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . He was 
under prevent ive detent ion s i n c e before t h e commence-
ment of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n under the Madras Maintenance of 
P\ibl ic Order Act, 1947, After enactment of prevent ive 
detent ion Act by t h e f i r s t parl iament in 19 50 a f resh 
order of detent ion was passed to keep him under deten-
t i o n uninterruptedly . He prayed for a wri t of habeas 
Corpus on the ground that the detent ion order was 
i l l e g a l and void# having been passed under the preven-
t i v e detention Act which, he urged, was uncons t i tu t iona l 
for reasons of being "in contravention** of Art. 1 3 ( 2 ) . He 
contended that i t "takes away or abridges t h e r ight s" 
under part I I I in genera l , and xinder A r t i c l e s 21-22 and 
Art. 19 of the c o n s t i t u t i o n , in p a r t i c u l a r . 
The main contention before the supreme court 
was that the e3q)ression "procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law" 
corresponded t o t h e phrase "due process of law" in the 
f i f t h and fourteenth Amendnent o f t h e U.S. Cons t i tu t ion , 
Therefore, i t must be understood i n the same manner and 
f l e x i b l e sense so as t o ccxnparable broadly the funda* 
mental p r i n c i p l e s o f natural j u s t i c e . On behalf of 
Gopalan, an attempt was made t o persuade the suprane 
court to hold t h a t t h e courts could adjudicate upon the 
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reasonableness of the prevent ive detent ion Act, or f o r 
tha t matter, any law depriving a person of h i s personal 
l i b e r t y , A three pronged argument was developed f o r t h i s 
purpose* 
(1) The word ' law' in Art. 21 does not mean merely 
enacted law but incorporates p r i n c i p l e s of natural 
Jus t i ce so t h a t a law to deprive a person of h i s 
l i f e or personal l i b e r t y can not be v a l i d u n l e s s 
I t incorporates t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s in the procedure 
l a i d down by i t . 
(2) The reasonableness of the law of prevent ive detention 
ought t o be judged under Art, 19, 
(3) The express ion 'procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law introduces 
in to India the American concept of procedural due pro-
cess which enables the courts t o see whether the 
law f u l f i l s t h e r e q u i s i t e e l a n e n t s of a reasonable 
procedure. 
Thus, in Gopalan, an attempt was made t o win for 
a detenu b e t t e r procedural safeguards than were avai lable 
t o him under the relevant law and Art .22 . But the attempt 
f a i l e d as the Supreme Court r e j e c t e d a l l these arguments. 
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Shri M.C, S«talvad, the learned Attorney -
General, appearing for the Union of India, the intervener , 
su]:xnitted that Act was not i n v a l i d . I t did not abridge 
any of the a l l eged r ights of t h e p e t i t i o n e r . He urged 
t h a t the guarantee of procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law was 
a pro tec t ion of nothing more than procedure prescr ibed 
by any law made by a competent l e g i s l a t u r e . The cons -
t i t u e n t Assembly had re jec ted t h e "due process" clause* 
and a l l that was meant by i t under the American Const i -
t u t i o n . The word ' law' in Art. 21 meant t h e enacted law# 
and not jus ; natural law. The court had no power of 
j u d i c i a l review as claimed by t h e American Supreme Court 
under due process c l a u s e . 
The s p e c i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n Bench, which heard the 
p e t i t i o n , c o n s i s t i n g of Kania C . j , , and Fazel A l l , S a s t r l , 
Mahajan, Mxikherjee and Das JJ . dismissed the p e t i t i o n by 
majority( Fazel A l i d i s s e n t i n t i n ^ . I t declared the pre -
v e n t i v e detention Act v a l i d , except sec t ion 14. 
The court held by majority that the word 'law* 
in Art. 21 could not be read as meaning rules of natural 
j u s t i c e . These ru le s were vague and i n d e f i n i t e and the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n could not be read as lay ing down a vague 
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standard. Nowhere in the c o n s t i t u t i o n the word ' law' 
was used in t h e sense of abstract law or natural j u s t i c e 
The word 'law* was used in the sense of l e x ( s t a t e made 
law) and liOt j u s . The procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law would 
therefore mean the procedure as l a i d down in an enacted 
law* 
2 
De l iver ing his judgement Kania C,J. sa id 
"No e x t r i n s i c aid i s needed t o Interpret the words 
of Art, 21 , , which in my opin ion , are not anbigucus, 
Nounally read, and without t h i n i k i n g of other c o n s t i -
t u t i o n s , the express ion "procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by l a / 
•* must mean procedure prescr ibed by the law of the 
s t a t e . 
If the Indian c o n s t i t u t i o n wanted t o preserve t o 
every person the protec t ion given by the due 
process c lauss o f t h e American c o n s t i t u t i o n there 
was nothing to prevent the Assembly from adopting 
the phrase or i £ they wanted t o l i m i t the same 
t o procedure only t o adopt that expression with 
only the word 'procedure* pref ixed t o ' l a w ' , * 
I t was contended in Gopalan that the express ion 
•procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law' in Art .21 was synonymous 
2 . AIR (1950) SC Supra at 139. 
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with the American concept of 'procedural due process' and, 
therefore the reasonableness of the preventive detention 
Act, or for that matter, of any law affecting a person's 
l i f e or personal l iberty should be jus t i c iab le in order 
to assess tihether the person affected was given a ri^fbt 
of fa ir hearing. The court rejected the contention giving 
several reasons. First the word 'due' was absent in 
Art. 21. This was a very s igni f icant omission for the 
ent ire efficacy of the procedural due process concept 
emanated from the word 'due' . Secondly the draft const i -
tution had contained the words due process of law* but 
these words were l a t e r dropped and the present expression 
adopted instead. This was strong evidence to show that 
the constituent Assembly did not desire to introduce into 
India the concept of procedural due process. This was 
done mainly to avoid the uncertainty surrounding the 
due process concept. The judic ia l decisions in the U.S.A. 
On what was reasonable had not been uniform. The concept 
of 'reasonable' had vairied from judge to judge, statue 
to statue, time to time and sxibject t o subject. Thirdly 
the American doctrine generated the countervailing, but 
complicated, doctrine of pol ice power to restr ic t the 
ambit of due process, i . e . the doctrine of governmental 
power to regulate private rights in public in teres t . If 
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the doctr ine of due process were imported i n t o India 
then the doctr ine o f p o l i c e power might a l s o have t o be 
imported which would make th ings very complicated. 
De l iver ing his judgement Kania CJ observed; 
"To read t h e word 'law* as meaning rules of 
natural j u s t i c e w i l l land one in d i f f i c u l t i e s 
because the rules of natural j u s t i c e , as regards 
procedure, are no where def ined and in my opinion 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n can not read as laying down a 
vague standard. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y so when in 
omit t ing to adopt "due process of law" i t was cons i -
dered the ejqpression "procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law" 
made the standard s p e c i f i c . I t can not be s p e c i f i c 
except by reading the express ion as meaning proce-
dure prescr ibed by the l e g i s l a t u r e . The word law 
as used in t h i s part has d i f f e r e n t shades of 
meaning but in no other A r t i c l e i t appears t o bear 
the i n d e f i n i t e meaning of natural j u s t i c e . I f s o , 
there appears no reason why in t h i s A r t i c l e i t should 
rece ive t h i s p e c u l i a r meaning." 
Shastr i J , Thought that Art , 21, l i k e i t s American 
prototype in the 5th and 14th amendknents, presented an 
3 . Ibid 
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eKWiple of fusion of procedural and substant ive r i g h t s 
in the same p r o v i s i o n . The f i r s t and e s s e n t i a l st«p in 
t t e procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by l a ^ must be a law made by 
a competent l e g i s l a t a r e , author i s ing deprivat ion of 
personal l i b e r t y or l i f e . He was unable t o agree that 
the 'law* In t h i s context mean t h e immutable and univer-
s a l p r i n c i p l e of natural j u s t i c e , because, h i s strong 
b e l i e f in the p r i n c i p l e o f parliamentary supermacy p r i n -
4 
c i p l e . he eiald; 
"The procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law must be taken 
t o re fer t o a procedure which has a s ta tu tory 
or ig in* for no procedure i s known, or can be sa id 
t o have been e s t a b l i s h e d by such vague and uncer-
t a i n concepts as t h e immutable and universa l pr in -
c i p l e s of natural J u s t i c e , " 
Law, he c l e a r l y maintained meant p o s i t i v e or s t a t e 
made law. 
Giving f u l l e f f e c t t o above p r i n c i p l e s he 
5 
observed; 
"I am unable t o agree that the term 'law* in 
Art.21 means the immutable and universal p r i n c i p l e s 
of natural j u s t i c e . " 
4 . AIR (1950) Sc at p72 
5. ib id 
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Mukherji J. said that the constitution was 
supreme* and a man could not be deprived of his personal 
l iber ty unless the s tate acted according to the codified 
law which provided for deprivation of such l iber ty . The 
word procedure meant the manner and form of enforcement 
of the law. Of course in order that there might be a 
va l id law« the leg i s la ture should be competent to enact 
i t in accordance with Art. 246 of the constitution by 
reference to any of the items in the l e g i s l a t i v e l i s t s . 
I t was also necessairy that a law must not offend against 
the fundamental r ights . The word 'due* had been del ibe-
rately omitted. The word 'established* ordinarily meant 
' f ixed or la id down', with the user of the esqpression 
"natural law or natural Justice" i t would not be appro-
pr iate to use the word established. The word 'law' accor-
dingly had been used in the sense of the s tate made law* 
and was not equivalent to the law in the abstract or gene-
ral sense embodying the principles of natural Jus t ice . 
6 Enunciating t h i s principle Mtikherjl J. concluded; 
* My conclusion, therefore, i s that in Art.21 
the word 'law' has been used in the sense of s tate 
made law and not as an equivalent of law in the 
abstract or general sense embodying the principles 
6. ibid at p. 103 
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Of Natural, j u s t i c e . The Article presupposes that 
the law i s a val id and binding law under the pro-
visions of the constitution having regard to the 
competency of the leg i s la ture and the subject i t 
relates to and does not infringe any of the funda-
mental rights which the constitution provides for." 
Das J. stated that Art.21 defined the substantive 
fundamental right to which protection was given« and did 
not purport to prescribe any part icular procedure at al l* 
The right to l i f e and personal l iber ty which was protected 
was not an absolute right. I t was a qual i f ied right - a 
right circumscribed by the p o s s i b i l i t y , or risk of being 
los t according to procedure established by law. The power 
of deprivation was exercisable i by procedure established 
by law. This clause was in the nature of a l imitat ion. It 
delimited the right by the insistency of the condition of 
deprivation of personal l iberty unly according to procedure 
established by law# and threw the obligation on the state 
to follow a legal procedure in the matter. What that proce-
dure would be was indicated only in Art. 22, The word "pro-
dedure" should be taken to signify some step, method,manner 
or course of proceeding leading up to the deprivation of 
l i f e or personal l iber ty . The word "established" in i t s 
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ordinary natural sense meant "enacted" or "established 
by law". I t meant "enacted by law". If th i s was a c c ^ -
ted, the word 'law* could not poss ibly mean the pr inc i -
p l e s of natural j u s t i c e . The procedure established by law 
must be procedure enacted by the s t a t e , which by d e f i -
nit ion of Art.12 included parliament. There was no e s -
cape from t h i s pos i t ion , i f the cardinal rule of cons-
truction, namely, to give the words used in a statue 
the ir ordinaxry natural meaning was applied. The pro-
dedure established by law was quite compatible with the 
procedure enacted by law. 
7 To quote Das J . 
"Apart from the question whether any rule of 
natural procedure ex i s t s which confozms to the 
notions of Justice and f a i r play of a l l mankind 
at a l l times, i t has to be ascertained whether 
the language of Art. 21 wi l l permit i t s in tro-
duction into our const i tut ion. The question then 
arises as to what i s the meaning of the e^qpresslon 
"procedure established by law". The word 'proce-
dure* in Art, 21 must be taken t o s ignify some step 
or method or manner of proceeding leading up to the 
deprivation of l i f e or personal l iber ty . According 
7. ibid p-114 
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to the language, used in Art, t h i s procedure 
has to be 'establ ished by law*. The word*establi-
shed' iD i t s ordinary natural sense means, amongst 
other things "enacted", "EsteJ^lished by law" w i l l , 
therefore mean * enacted by law*. If th i s sense of 
word "established i s accepted then the %rord *law* 
must mean s ta te made law and can not poss ibly mean 
the principles of natural Just ice , for no procedure 
can be said to have been "enacted" by thoseprin-
c i p l e s . " 
Mahalan J. said that the declaration contained In 
the preanble made the constitution sublime, and the guaran-
tees mentioned in the chaf>ter on fundamental r i ^ t s made i t 
one of the greatest chapters of l iber ty . Nevertheless, i t 
was quite obvious that the court could not declare a statute 
unconstitutional and void simply on the ground of unjast and 
oppressive, or because, i t was supposed to v io late natural, 
soc ia l or p o l i t i c a l rights of e i t i z e n s unless i t could be 
shown that such in jus t i ce was prohibited or such rights 
were guaranteed and protected by the const i tut ion. I t 
could not also be declared void, because, in the opinion 
of the court, i t was opposed to the s p i r i t supposed to 
pervade the constution, although not e;qpressed in words. 
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I t i s d i f f i c u l t on any geeeral principles to l i n i t the 
omnipotence of the sovereign l e g i s l a t i v e power by judi-
c ia l interposit ion, except in 80 far as the express words 
of the constitution gave that authority, 
Fazel Ali J. delivered a strong dissent in the name 
of l iberty and ffeedom cherished by the man. He read the 
constitution as i t was# and he understood i t in the sense 
given out by i t s words. He did not recognise any over-
riding considerations inferrable from any general statement 
of the Drafting committee, o r the constituent Assanbly 
Debate. He wished to art iculate an authoritative escposi-
t ion of the meaning of the words, and f e l t that no overri-
ding consideration could compel the court to put a meaning 
opposed to reason and authority. He would not be deterred 
from giving ef fect to a fundamental right granted under 
the constitution mer.ely, because, avague andunfouaded . 
fear that some catastrophe might occur . 
Fazel Ali J. disagreeing with the majority view 
held that the principle of natural Justice that *no one 
shall be condemned unheard' was part of tiie general law of 
the land and the same should accordingly be read into Art.21. 
Procedure established by law must Include the principles that 
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no person should be condemned without a heaxring by an 
Impartial tribunal, whatever e l s e . It might « or might 
not include. The word 'law' used in Art,21 did not mean 
only the enacted law. This was c lear from the fact 
that though no statute la id down the complete procedure to 
be adopted in contompt cases, yet such procedure as applied 
by the court prevailed as part of our law. He was aware 
that some Judges have esqpressed a strong d i s l ike for the 
escpression* "natural just ice" on the ground that i t was too 
vague and e l a s t i c . He said that these were kno%m principles 
with no vaguness about them and exis ted as a l l systems of 
law respected and recognised them. They could not be dis-> 
regarded merely, because, they were in the ultimate analysis 
found to be based on "natural Justice". As ins i s ted that 
procedure established by law would include the cardinal 
principles audi alteram par tan. 
Q 
While dissenting he stated 
"Hie questiob i s whether the principle ths^ no 
person can be condemned without a hearing by an 
impartial tribunal which i s well recognised in a l l 
modem c i v i l i z e d systems of law and which Halsbury 
puts on a par w i l l well recognised fundamental ri^fttt 
8. ib id at p 60 
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can not be regarded as part of the lav of this country. 
Z anast confess that I find it difficult to give a 
negative answer to this question. The principle being 
part of the British system of law and procedure we 
have inherited* has been observed in this country 
for a very long time. It that is so then procedure 
established by law must include this principle* what-
ever else it may or may not include. That the word 
*law* used in Art.21 does not mean only state-made 
law is clear from the fact that though there is no 
statute laying down the complete procedure to be 
adopted in contempt of court cases* when the court 
is not with in the view of the court, yet such proced-
ure as now prevails in these cases is part of our 
law." 
Che procedure established by law is* as was a^ greed 
by Kania C.J* Mukherji and Das J.J. among those forming 
the majoxlty in the Gopalan* the procedure enacted by 
parliament* or a state legislature. The word 'procedure' 
used in the clause means the manner and form of enforce-
ment of law; and the word 'established* should be taken 
to mean 'fixed' or 'laid down' by legislative prescription. 
Explaining the concept of the guarantee of procedure esta-
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b l l s h e d by law,MukherJl J« observed that a p la in reading 
of the c lause leads to the conclusion that the s t a t e can 
not d e r i v e a man of h i s personal l i b e r t y un le s s i t choo-
ses t o fo l low, and a c t u a l l y acts according t o law, which 
provides for deprivat ion of l i f e and personal l i b e r t y . In 
the context a law i s a v a l i d l y enacted law by parl iament, 
or by a s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e under Art .246 read with the 
appropriate l e g i s l a t i v e l i s t e n t r i e s , given in the seventh 
shedule . Mahajan J . thought t h a t the c lause recjuired the 
e x i s t e n c e of a subs tant ive law as a condit ion precedent 
t o any act ion a f f e c t i n g the l i f e or l i b e r t y of an i n d i -
v i d u a l . Ihere must e x i s t a subs tant ive law, conferring 
author i ty upon the Government t o deprive an ind iv idua l 
of h i s l i f e or personal l i b e r t y ; and i t must a l s o provide 
f o r a mode or procedure for such depr ivat ion . 
But Fazel Al l J . l a i d emphasis on cer ta in b a s i c 
p r i n c i p l e s e . g . the p r i n c i p l e tha t no one should be 
condemned without a hearing by an impart ial t r i b u n a l . The 
word 'law* he added, "does not inc lude only s t a t e made law". 
RELATION BETWEEN ARTS. 21 , 22 AND 19 
An attempt was made by p e t i t i o n e r in Gopalan t o 
e s t a b l i s h a l ink between t h e s e three Arts . The purpose 
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was to persuade the court to adjudge the reasonableness 
of the preventive Detention Act. I t was therefore argued 
that when a person was detained, h i s several rights under 
Art.19 (except the right t o hold property under Art, 19(1) 
(f) were affected and thus the reasonableness of the law« 
and the procedure contained therein* should be Just ic iable 
with reference to Art* 19(2) to (6} , Rejecting the argument* 
the court pointed out that the word 'personal liberty* in 
Art,21 in i t s e l f had a comprehensive content and ordinarily 
i f l e f t alone, would include not only freedom from arrest 
or detention, but a lso various freedoms guaranteed by 
Art. 19, However reading Arts. 19 and 21 together. Art. 19 
roust be held t o deal with a few spec i f i c freedoms and not 
with freedom from detention whether punitive or preventive. 
Similarly, Art.21 should be held as excluding the freedoms 
dealt ' with in Art. 19, The court ruled that Art.20 to 22 
constitutred a comprehensive code and embodied the ent ire 
constitutional protection in relation to l i f e and personal 
l i b e r t y and was not controlled by Art. 19. Thus a l^w 
depadLving personal l iber ty had to conform with Arts,20 t o 
22 and not with Art.19, which covered a separate and 
d i s t i n c t ground. Art.19 could be invoked only by a freeman 
and not one under arrest . Further Art, 19 could be invoked 
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only when a law direct ly attempted to control a right 
mentioned therein. Therefore a law direct ly control l ing 
a c i t i z e n ' s freedom of speech could be tested under Art, 
19 ( 2 ) . Bat Art. 19 could not be Invoked when a law not 
d i rec t ly in respect of a right mentioned therein infringed 
a right guaranteed by Art, 19. This judic ia l approach m««iit 
that a pretientive detention law would be val id and be %»ith-
in the terms of Art. 21 so long as i t conformed with Art. 22 
and i t would not be required to meet the chailQjige cf Art. 
19, Pazel Ali J, differing with the majority, held that 
Art. 19(1) (d) did control Arts.21 and 22, because jur id ica l ly 
freedona of movement was en essent ia l requisite of personal 
l iberty# and« therefore, the reasonableness of t h e preven-
t i v e Detention Act should be jus t i c iab le under Art. 19, 
Vfhen A.K. Gopalan, a ocmmuniat leader was detained 
under the preventive Detention Act in 1950 he chanllenged 
the const i tut iona l i ty . I t was in that case the scope of 
'procedure established by law* came to be determined. In 
view of the h i s tor ic pronouncement of the Supreme co ir t 
9 in Gopalan's Case , i t became the se t t l ed position that 
law would include every law# even the rules of procedure 
for enforcement of the powers, pr iv i leges and immunities 
of the state l eg i s la ture . 
9. A.K. Gopalan VS State of Madras AIR (1950) SC 27 
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In M.S.M. Shaiwa^^^ i t was he ld that i f a c i t i z e n 
of India i s deprived of h i s personal l i b e r t y as a r e s u l t 
of t h e proceedings before the committee o f p r i v i l e g e s , 
such deprivat ion w i l l be in accordance with procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d by law and can not ocxnplaiD of the breach, 
ac tua l or threatened of h i s fundamental r i g h t under A r t . 2 1 , 
Down the years the same i n t e r p r e t a t i o n held in the 
sway* 
In R&m Chandra Prasad, a construct ion Engineer 
a c c ^ t e d a sum of Rs. 1 0 , 0 0 0 / - as i l l e g a l g r a t i f i c a t i o n 
from a contractor carrying on b u s i n e s s under the name and 
s t y l e o f Hindustan Engineering and construct ion company. 
The courts disbel ieved the defence that he had taken 
the envelope conta in ing t h i s atnount not knowing t h a t i t 
contained papers r e l a t i n g t o contrac t . The c o n s t i t u t i o n a -
l i t y of sec. 4 . of the prevent ion of corruption Act was 
quest ioned as v i o l a t i v e of Art ,21 of the c o n s t i t u t i o h . 
12 Relying upon Gopalati's case Supreme court observed. 
10. MSM Sharma VS Sri Krishna Sinha AIR 1959 SC 395 
11• Rarochandra Prasad V. S ta teof Bihar AIR 1961 SC 1629 
12. ibid 
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"the word 'law* has been used in the sense of s ta te -
made law and not as an equivalent of law in the abstract 
or general sdnse embodying the principles of natural 
ju s t i c e , and 'procedure established by law's means 
law made by the s t a t e , that i s to say^by the union 
parilanent or the l eg i s la ture of the s ta tes . Sec. 4 
has been enacted by parliament and therefore i t must be 
held that what i t lays down id a procedure established 
by law." 
In Rati Lai Bhanjl ^^  the appellant alongwith other 
persons was being tr ied for an offence u/s. 120 of the IPC 
read with Sec.167 (81) of the Sea Cttstoms Act, 1878 and 
Sec. 5 of the Imports and Sscports control Act, 1947. The 
offence was bai lable , i^wever, l a t e r the High Court of 
Bombay in exerciso of i t s inherent jurisdict ion cancelled 
the bai l orders and directed him to surrender t o h i s 
b a i l . 
The question arose whether the deprivation of personal 
l i b e r t y by cancell ing the bail of t h e accused was v io la t ive 
of Art. 21. The Supreme Ccurt relying upon Gopalan's 
case held that the inherent powers of the High Court 
conferred under Sec.561A of Cr.P.C. (a pre-constitutional 
law), were preserved even after the consxitution. Such an 
13, Rati Lai Bhanji V. Asstt . Qistcms Collector Bonbay 
j^R 1967 SC 1939. 
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inherent power i s vested in the High Court by the law 
within the meaning of Art,21. The procedure for invoking 
the inherent powers ia regulated by the rules framed by 
the High Court, The powtf* to make such rule i s conferred 
by the constitution under Art.225. The previous rules 
were continued to be in force by the ba l l and depriving 
the appellant of h is personal l iber ty i s according t o 
'procedure established by law*. Therefore there i s no 
v io lat ion of Art. 21. 
14 In Govlnd the pet i t ioner alleged that several 
f e l s e cases had been f i l e d against him in criminal courts 
by the po l i ce . However* he if«« acquitted in all* but two 
cases . On that basis i t was said that he was a habitual 
offender and pol ice had opened a h i s tc^ sheet against him 
and he had been put under survei l lance. 
The pet i t ioner a lso stated that pol ice were making 
domiciliary v i s i t s both by day and by night at frequent 
in terva l s . His house was secret ly picketed by p o l i c e . His 
movements were watched by the patel of the v i l l a g e . When-
ever pol ice came to the v i l l age he was harrassed. The 
result was, his reputation had sunk in the estimation of 
h is neighbours. The actions of the police* according to 
14. Govind V. State of M.P. AIR 1975 Sc 1378 
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the petltlooer« were v io la t ive of h i s fundamental rights* 
including Art.21. Therefore he contended that Regulsitions 
B55 and B56 of the K.P. Police Regulations providing for 
surveil lance were unconstitutional . 
But the Supreme court held* 
" Depending on the chara^er and antecedents of the 
person subjected to surveil lance as also the objects 
and the l imitat ions under which survedLlance i s made* 
i t can not be said suxrveillance by domiciliary 
v i s i t s could always be unreasonable res t t i c t ion upon 
the right of privacy. Assuming that the fundamental 
rights e x p l i c i t l y guaranteed t o a c i t i zen have penu-
mberal zones and that the right to privacy i s i t s e l f 
a fundamental right* that fundamental right must be 
stibject t o res tr ic t ion on the basis of compelling 
public i n t e r e s t . As regulation B56 has the force of 
law* i t can not be said that the fundamental right 
of the pet i t ioner under Art. 21 has been violated 
by the provis ions. Contained in it* for* what i s 
guaranteed under that Art . i s that no person shall be 
deprived of his l i f e or personal l iberty except by 
the procedure established by law." 
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15 
An Important quest ion afips« in S ta te of U.P.V.Poosa • 
whether fi|n order d i r e c t i n g th* r e - a r r e s t and d e t e c t i o n of 
of an accused who had been ac<|uitt)ed by t h e High Court 
was v i o l a t i v e o f Aflft.21. I t was he ld th^t i t d id not in any 
way offend Art* 21 , Because such an order was made i n 
e x e r c i s e of i t s pie.nary j u r i s d i c t i o n conferred under Axts. 
136 and 142 of the c o n s t i t u t i o n . By no s t r e t c h of imagi-
nat ion could i t be s a i d tha t such an order deprived t h e 
accused of h i s l i b e r t y in a manner otherwise than in acco-
rdance with law. 
The correc tness of the law l a i d down in Gopalan*a 
case was never s e r i o u s l y doubted by any judgement of the 
supreme court t i l l in R.C. Cooper V, Union# an eleven 
judge bench, "reconsidered Gopalan's case and >ield by 
a majori ty of 10 $1 t h a t i t was wrongly decided becuase 
the majority i n Gopalan t r e a t e d the fundamental r i g h t s 
conferred by var ious a r t i c l e s as mutual ly exc lus ive* hence 
i n Bank n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n c a s e i ; h e r i g i d Judic ia l view was 
scxnewhat softened and a new trend began t o emerge. After 
t h i s case« i t could be l e g i t i m a t e l y argued t h a t i f A r t . 
19(1) (f) was l inked with A r t . 3 1 ( 2 ) , then there was no 
reason why Art^ 19 could not be l i n k e d with Arts .21 and 22. 
The supreme court recognised the force of t h i s l o g i c when 
17 i t declared in Sarobhu Saxkar that the approach of t h e 
15. S t a t e of U.P.V. Poosu AIR 1976 SC 1750. 
16. AIR (1970) 3 SCR 530 
17. SanbhuMath Sarkar V. West Bengal AIR 1973 Sc 1425 
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court in Bank N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n case had held the major 
premise of the major i ty in Gopalan to be i n c o r r e c t . 
In another major development from t h i s po int of 
18 
view, tn the Bennett Coleman case the court overruled 
t h e argument t h a t Art. 19(1) (a) could not apply t o a law 
a f f e c t i n g freedom of speech but not enacted d i r e c t l y with 
respect to Art. 19(1) (a) . The court declared t h a t i f a law 
a f f e c t e d freedom of speech, i t s reasonableness became 
a s s e s s a b l e with reference t o Art.19 (2) eventhough i t 
was not enacted d i r e c t l y t o control t h e freedom of speech. 
This completely knocked cut the courts e a r l i e r argument 
in Gopalan that Art.19 applied only when a law wes passed 
d i r e c t l y in respect of a matter f a l l i n g under i t , and 
not when a law not d i r e c t l y in respect of a r i g h t under 
A r t . 1 9 , s t i l l abridged such a r i g h t . 
Thus h i t h e r t o the marked dlstinr^tion between fdue pro-
c e s s c lause " and "the procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law" had 
been maintained throughout. Ho«etrer« for the f i r s t t ime . 
In Bank N a t i o n a l i z a t i o n case t h e pendulam swung from 
"procedure" to "due process" . 
18. Benett Coleman & Co. V l a d i a AIR 1973 SC 106 
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CHAPTER - V 
CHANGINS CX)NCEPT OF PHRASE 
'PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW* 
IN 
MANEKA GANDHI^  
I t I s a landnark case of the post-emergency 
p e r i o d . This case shows how l i b e r a l tendencies have 
inf luenced the Supreme court in the matter of i n t e r -
p r e t i n g fundamental r ights* P a r t i c u l a r l y Art*21, A 
great transformation have come about in the Jud ic ia l 
a t t i t u d e towards the protec t ion of personal l i b e r t y 
a f t e r the traumatic and b i t t e r experience of t h e emergen-
cy during 1975-77 when personal l i b e r t y had reached i t s 
nad ir . Since then the Supreme Court has shown great 
s e n s i t i v i t y to the protec t ion of personal l i b e r t y . The 
court has re - In terpre ted Art ,21 and p r a c t i c a l l y over-
ruled Gppalan. 
Maneka's passport was impounded in 'pub l i c 
i n t e r e s t ' by an ord«r dated July 2, 1977. The Government 
of India decl ined ' i n the i n t e r e s t of general p u b l i c ' 
t o furnish the reasons for i t s d e c i s i o n s . Thereupon she 
1. Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India (1978)1 SCC 248 
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f i l e d th is writ pet i t ion under Art. 32 of the constitution 
to challenge that order. The challenge was founded on 
the following grounds 
(1) To the extent t o which S-10(3) (c)of the passports 
Act, 1967, authorises the passport authority to im-
pound a passport ' in the in teres t of general publ ic ' , 
i t i s v io lat ive of Art,14 of the constitution since i t 
confers vague and undefined power on the passport autho-
r i t y . 
(2) Sec<10(3}(c) i s void as conferring an arbitrary power 
s ince i t does not provide for a hearing of the holder 
of the passport before the passport i s impounded. 
(3) Sec,10(3) (c) i s vo i la t ive of Art-21 of the const i tu-
t ion since i t does not prescribe 'procedure' within the 
meaning of that a r t i c l e and i f i t i s held that procedure 
has been prescribed, i t i s arbitrary and unreasonable. 
Five separate Judgements were delivered, oamely 
by Beg CJ,, by Chandrachud J . , by Bhagwati J . , for himself 
and Untawalia and Fazel Ali JJ. , by Krishna Aiyer J . , and 
by Kailasafi J. 
« 
The leading opinion in Manek^ was prppunded by 
Just ice Bha^^iti* The court la id down a number of 
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propos i t ion seeking t o make Art .21 much more meaningful 
than h i t h e r t o . 
Maneka was b e l i e v e d to have resurrected American 
procedural due proces s in Art .21 which was freed from 
the confines of Gopalan on 'procedure* Maneka t o l d us 
t h a t i t a law depriving a person of h i s l i f e or personal 
l i b e r t y and prescr ib ing a procedure had t o stand t h e 
t e s t of one or more fundamental r i g h t s conferred under 
Art .19 which may be appl icable in a given s i t u a t i o n , 
ex hypothesi i t must a l s o be l i a b l e t o be t e s t e d wi th 
reference to Art . 14, The counc drew i t s sustenance from 
t h e observation of J u s t i c e Pazl A l l in Gqpalan who spoke 
in favour of a procedure which inc luded certa in p r i n c i p l e s 
of natural j u s t i c e and which was not arbitrary, f a n c i f u l 
or oppress ive . According t o Maneka, a "procedure* could 
no more be a mere enacted or s t a t e prescribed procedure as 
l a i d down in Gopalan but had t o be a f a i r , j u s t and 
reasonable proceaurcv The most notable and innovat ive 
holding in Maneka, as observed by Bhagwati J , was t h a t 
"the p r i n c i p l e of reasonableness which l e g a l l y 
as wel l as p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y i s an essent ia l^ lament of 
e q u a l i t y or non arlpitrarlness pervades Art .14 l i k e a 
2 . A.K.Gopalan VS s t a c e of Madras AIR (1950) SC.27 
3' ?vii?ya Btl at ?93 
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brooding omnipresence, and the procedure contemplated by 
Art»21 must answer the t e s t of reasonableness in order 
t o be in conformity with Art 14 ," 
Further according t o Maneka« even on p r i n c i p l e the 
concept of reasonableness must be pro jec ted in t h e proce-
dure oontanplated by Art.21 having regard t o t h e iirpact 
of Art . 14 or Art /21 and, there fore . Bhaorwati J . added 
"the procedure must be a r i g h t . Just and f a i r 
5 
and not arbi trary , fanci fu l or oppress ive ." 
Therefore the courtrie i terated the propos i t ion 
t h a t Arts. 14, 19 and 21 were not mutually e x c l u s i v e . 
This means a law prescr ib ing a procedure f o r depriving 
a person of 'personal l iber ty* has t o meet the require-
ment of Art,19 a l s o , the procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law 
in Art .21 must answer the requirement of Art««14 as w e l l . 
According to Krishna Iver J . no A r t i c l e in par t 
I I I of the c o n s t i t u t i o n (deal ing with fundamental r ights ) 
i s an i s l a n d . Just as a man i s not d i s s e c t i b l e i n t o 
separate l imbs, cardinal r ight s in an organic c o n s t i t u t i o n 
have a s y n t h e s i s . 
I t i s the most s i g n i f i c a n t and crea t ive aspect of 
4 , Id at 284 
5 . Ibid 
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Maneka that# the court re interpreted the e^qpresslon 
'procedure estaJalished by law* in Art. 21 and gave i t a new 
o r i e n t a t i o n . Art .21 would no longer mean t h a t law could 
prescr ibe some s«nblance of procedure, however a r b i t r a r y 
or f a n c i f u l , t o deprive a person of h i s personal l i b e r t y . 
I t woaid now mean that the procedure must s a t i s f y certa in 
r e q u i s i t e s in the sense of being f a i r and reasonable. The 
procedure "can not be arbitrary, u n f a i r or unreasonable". 
The concept of reasonableness must be projected in the 
procedure contemplated by Art, 21 . The court now has 
power t o judge the f a i r n e s s and Justness of procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d by law t o deprive a person of h i s personal 
l i b e r t y . The court reached t h i s conclusion by hoiding 
t h a t Arts , 21,19 and 14 were not mutually e x c l u s i v e , but Were 
i n t e r e l i n k e d . 
According to Iyer J . , Procidure in Art. 21 means 
f a i r , not formal procedure; ' law' i s reasonable law and 
not any enacted p iece* This makes t h e words "procedure 
e s t a b l i s h e d by law* by and large synonymous with t h e 
procedural due p r o c e s s ' in the USA. This makes r ight 
of hearing a component part of natural J u s t i c e . As the 
r i g h t t o t rave l abroad f a l l s under Art»2l , there fore , 
natural j u s t i c e must be , appl ied whi le e x e r c i s i n g the 
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power of iicpounding a passport under the passport Act. 
Although the passport Act does not eaqpressly provide 
f o r the requirement of hearing be fore a passport i s 
impounded* yet the same has t o b e impl ied therein* 
But Gopalan on "law" remained i n t a c t even in 
Maneka« In h i s l ead ing opinion J u s t i c e Bhagwati observed 
t h a t Art .21 provided safeguards aga ins t execut ive i n t e r -
ference which was not supported by a law and "law means 
-6 
enacted law or s t a t e law" 
J u s t i c e Chandrachud af ter not ing the absence of 
'due process c lause* in t h e Indian c o n s t i t u t i o n and i t s 
7 
r e j e c t i o n by t h e c o n ^ t u e n t Assembly observed. 
"The presence, o f due process c lause in 5th and 
14th Amendments of the American cons i tu t ion makes 
a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e t o the i^proach of the 
American Judges to the d e f i n i t i o n and evaluat ion 
of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantees . The content which was 
meaning-ful ly and imaginat ive ly poured i n t o •due 
process of law* may* in my view, c o n s t i t u t e an impor-
tant point of d i s t i n c t i o n between the American cons-
t i t u t i o n and ours which s t u d i o u s l y avoided the use 
of that expres s ion ," 
• • 
6. Id at 281 
7. Id at 327 
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He wanted t o say that whi le American courts could 
examine a c t merely reasonableness of procedure (procedu-
ral due process) but a l s o whether a law was £air« j u s t 
and reasonable* the absence of a due process prov i s ion 
hindered the Indian courts t o go so f a r as t o s c z u t i n i z e 
t h e moral i ty or reasonableness of a law. 
J u s t i c e Krishna I y e r ' s was^tbe Icme vo ice in 
Manek^ who t r e a t e d j.aw as reasonable law and procedure 
g 
as reasonable procedure. He was convinced t h a t 
"to f r u s t r a t e Art ,21 by r e l y i n g on any formal 
ad jec t i va l s t a t u t e s , however f l imsy or f a n t a s t i c 
i t s prov i s ions be* i s to rob what the cons t i tu t ion 
treasures And 'law* l eaves t i t t l e doubt that 
i t i s noxmally regarded as Just s i n c e law i s the 
means and j u s t i c e i s the end." 
9 
In Sunll Batra J u s t i c e Krishna Iyer was able t o 
proclaims 
"True, our c o n s t i t u t i o n has no due process c lause 
but in t h i s branch of law* a f t e r Cooperand Maneka 
Gandhi * the consequence i s the S£»:te. For what i s 
p u n i t i v e l y outrageous* s c a n d a l i c i n g l y unusual, or cruel 
8 . Id at 338 
9 . Sunil Batra V. Delhi Administration (1978)4 3CC.494 
10 . Id at 516 
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or r e h a b i l i t a t i v e ! y counter - productive i s 
unarguably unreasonable and arbi trary and i s 
shot down by Arts .14 and 19 and i f i n f l i c t e d 
with procedural unfa irness f a l l s foul of 
A r t . 2 1 . " 
post Maneka cases wit^nnessed an outburst of due 
proces dec i s ion convert ing most of A r t i c l e 21 i n t o a 
regin»e of p o s i t i v e r i g h t s . Right t o l i f e and personal 
l i b e r t y soon came t o encompass within I t the r i g h t t o 
ba i l« r ight against s o l i t a r y confinement^ r i g h t t o 
Humanetreatment in prison^ t h e r i g h t t o human d i g n i t y 
and even the r ight t o get compensation for undergoing 
tortuv^e. The court innovated the s t r a t e g y of what i s 
c a l l e d publ ic i n t e r e s t l i t i g a t i o n or s o c i a l act ion l i t i -
12 g a t i o n , enabling t h e publ i c s p i r i t e d ind iv idua l s or 
groups t o move the court t o seek redress f o r the v i c t i -
mised groups. Then in severa l cases the court pre-empted 
l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e s for reform i o Ja i l * bal l : and pro» 
ce s sua l Jurisprudence. But Art 21 . s t i l l remained the 
11 . M.H.Hfiskeet V. s t a t e of Maharashtra(1978) 3 SCq 544, 
Hussainara Khatoon V, State of Bihar(1980) ISCC 8 1 , 9 1 , 9 3 , 
98, 108, Sunil Batra V. Delhi Administration(1980) 2 SGC 
648, Kedra Pehad-lya V. s t a t e of Bihar (1981)3 S s c 671, 
Prem Shankar Shukla V. Delhi Administration (1980) 3 SCC 
526, Francis Coral ie V. Union Terr i tory of Delhi (1982)1 
se.c 608, Rudal Shah.V. S t a t e of Bihar AIR 1983 Sc ,1061 . 
12. Upendra Baxi "Taking SufferijJsU^H^^ously x S o c i a l 
ac t ion . 
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embodlmeat of procedural due process ar?d had not matured 
as a l i m i t a t i o n aga ins t l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n . But Art, 21 
s t i l l remained the embodiiment of procedural due process 
and had not matured as a l i m i t a t i o n against l e g i s l a t i v e 
a c t i o n . 
In Bachan Sinql^ the court again r e l i e d on t h e 
absence of t h e American due process c lause and e i g h t 
Amendment for upholding death pana l ty . Speaking f or t h e 
majority* j u s t i c e Saricaria held that t h e courts were not 
law makers and t h u s could not s i t over the wisdom of Par-
l iament which alone could decide whether t o reta in or 
a b o l i s h death pana l ty . Chief J u s t i c e Chandrachud was 
party t o Bachan Singh as wel l as t o Sunil Batra«tiie 
former symbolising the l e g a l i s t r o l e perception of t h e 
j u s t i c e s and the l a t t e r * an a c t i v i s t reformist role* 
In Bachan Singh« the court c l a r i f i e d t h ^ i f Art. 
21 was understood in accordance wi th Maneka i t w i l l - r e a d 
14 t o says 
No person s h a l l be deprived of h i s l i f e o r p e r s o -
nal l i b e r t y except accoreing t o fair« Jus t and reaso-
nable procedure e s tab l i shed by a v a l i d law. 
l i t i g a t i o n in t h e Supreme Court of India"* 
8-9 Delfci law review 91(1979-80) ; Parmanand Singh 
"Vindicating Publ ic I n t e r e s t Through J u d i c i a l 
Process: Trends and I s sues" , 10 India bar review 
683 (1983) 
13 . Bachan Singh V, S t a t e of Puajab (1980)2 SCC 684 
14. Id at 730 — 
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Bachan Singh re-aff irmed t h a t the ' a l l pervas ive 
C3ranipresence o± reasonableness of Art. 14 inf luenced t h e 
In terpre ta t ion of procedure* and not of *law*. 
In A,K. Rov^^ caiief J u s t i c e Chandrachud r e - a f f i r ^ 
med h i s Maneka p o s i t i o n that Art .21 did not permit Judic ia l 
review o f reasonableness o f t h e subs tant ive port ion of 
the l^w. I t allowed Judic ia l s c r u t i n y of procedural f a i r -
ness o n l y . He held that# 
•Power t o judge the f a i r n e s s and j u s t n e s s of 
procedure e s t a b l i s h e d by law f o r t h e purpose of 
Art .21 i s one th ing" but "the power t o decide upon 
t h e j u s t n e s s of the law i t s e l f i s qui te another 
thing" and "such power springs from a 'due process* 
provis ion sucn as t o be found i n t h e f i f t h and 14th 
Amendments of the American Const i tut iot i . ' ' 
I n t e r e s t i n g l y enough. J u s t i c e Bhagwati was a party 
in A.K.Roy yet in h i s d i s s e n t i n g opinion de l ivered by hijn 
i n 1982 in Bachan Singn decided subsequent t o ^«K« Roy» 
he took a view of Art ,21 which makes a strange reading. 
This time he in terpre ted *procedure* i t s e l f as inc luding 
18 both substant ive and procedural due process* He observed. 
15. AK Roy V. Union of India (1982) I SGg 271 
16. Id at 301 
17. Bachan SinghV. state of Punlab (1982)3 SCC ?4 
18. Id at 55 
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"The word 'procedure* in Art. 21 i s wide enough 
to cover the entire process by which the depriva-
tion i s effected and that would include not only 
the adject ival but also substantive part of the 
law Every facet of the law which deprives 
a person of h i s l i f e or personal l iberty would, 
therefore, have t o stand the t e s t of reasonableness, 
fairness, and justness in order to be outside the 
inhibition of Art.21." 
Underlying Justice Bhagwati's opinion i s the notion that 
the substantive and procedural portions of law affecting 
deprivation are so inseparable that both must stand the 
t e s t of reasonableness, fairness and justness . He bel ieves 
that rule of law permeates the ent i re fabric of the 
19 constitution and constitute i t s bas i s feature. Rule 
of law excludes arbitrariness and, therefore, 
"law must not be arbitrary or irrational and i t 
must sat i s fy the t e s t of reason and the denoo&tic form 
20 Of policy", and the fr^ners of law are accountable to 
the people. 
21 In De»na though the Supreme Oourt upheld the 
procedure for executing death sentence by hanging a 
19. Id at 50 
20. Ibid 
21. Deena V, Union of India (I'^ 'SS) 4 S^C 645 
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conv ic t by rope in t h e majority opinion writ ten by Chief 
22 J u s t i c e Chandrachud i t was observed. 
"A two- fo ld considerat ion has t o be kept in mind 
in the area of sentenc ing . S u b s t a n - t i v e l y , t h e 
sentence has t o meet the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l prescr ip t ion 
contained e s p e c i a l l y in Art. 14 and 21. procedural ly 
the method by which the sentence i s required by law 
m 
t o be executed has t o meet t h e mandate of Art, 21 , 
Thus every procedure prescr ibed by law need not 
s a t i s f y the q u a l i t y of law preser lbed by Art. 14 in order 
t o be outs ide the i n h i b i t i o n of Art . 2 1 , The court in Deena# 
t h e r e f o r e , upheld t h e exeeut icn of death sentence by 
hanging by r ope because according t o t h e court , i t was 
not a c ru e l , barbarious and degrading method. The j u s t i c e s 
d i scussed only the question of burden of proof under 
A r t s . 1 4 , 1 9 and 21 but the procedure prescr ibed by s ec .354 
(5) was never t e s t e d upon t h e touchstone of reason-
ableness o f A r t . 1 4 , I t means tha t Art.14 w i l l be invoked 
on ly i f i t i s shown t h a t although the procedure f u l f i l l s 
t h e requirements of A r t . 2 1 , i t a l s o v i o l a t e s Art. 14, 
23 Mithu involved the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v a l i d i t y of S^c. 
303 of IPC prescr ib ing mandatory death sentence f o r t h e 
22. Id at 689 
2 3 . Mithu V. S ta te of Punjab (1983)2 SCC 278 
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offence of murder committed by a convict undergoing l i f e 
sentence. The court struck down Sec.303 of the IPC as 
v io la t ive of Arts.14 and 21, Since Sec 303 involved the 
substantive portion of the law in the area of sentencing 
i t had to meet the requirement of reasonableness of Art. 
14 in order to be in conformity with Art,21. 
In Mithu the absence of a due frocess clause did 
not hinder the chief just ice to go into the question of 
the morality or justness of the law as distinguished from 
the justness of the procedure. The supreme court charac-
ter ized the provision of mandatory death sentence as anad>-
ronism and out of tune with the constitutional values. 
Such a provision excluded judic ia l discretion in the 
area of sentencing and treated equals as unequals. This 
judic ia l role perception Is quite different from the 
l e g a l i s t stance in Bachan Singh. Mithu declared that the 
ultimate decisions as to jus t i ce and farlQess rested on 
the courts and not on parliament. The chief j u s t i c e dec-
1 ^ 24 
l a red. 
"It i s now too late to contend that It i s for the 
leg is lature to porovide punishment and for the courts 
to Impose i t . . . . A savage sentetrce i s anathema to 
the c i v i l i s e d jurisprudence of Art, 21, 
24. Id at 284 
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Apparent ly t h e c o u r t in Mlthu was ab le t o d e c l a r e 
••savage sent-ence*^ oS "anathema t o t h e c i v i l i s e d j u r i s p r u d e -
nce of A r t . 2 1 " only i f i t had t h e power t o s c r u t i n i s e t h e 
r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of t he s u b s t a n t i v e p o r t i o n of a law. Sava-
gery of sen tence i s an a t t r i b u t e of sx ibs tant ive law 
and not p r o c e d u r a l law. The cou r t exp res sed w i l l i n g n e s s 
t o s t r i k e down a l l laws which were found t o be u n f a i r , 
25 
u n j u s t and u n r e a s o n a b l e . 
" A law p r o v i d i n g t h a t an accused s h a l l no t be 
allowed t o l e a d evidence ift s e l f defence w i l l be 
h i t by A r t s . 14 and 2 1 , S i m i l a r l y i f a law were t o 
p rov ide t h a t t h e of fence of t h e f t w i l l b e pun ishab le 
with p e n a l t y o f t h e c u t t i n g of hands t h e law w i l l 
be b»»d as v i o l a t i n g Ar t . 2 1 , * 
Mithu i m p l i e s t h a t in t h e a r e a of s en tenc ing t h e 
s u b s t a n t i v e p o r t i o n of law a r e so i n t e r w i n e d wi th p r o c e -
d u r a l p o r t i o n s t h a t r e a sonab l enes s of bo th has t o b e t e s t e d 
in o r d e r t o be in conformity wi th A r t a . l 4 , and 2 1 . The 
r e s u l t achieved i n Mithu i s indeed commendable one , 
Andhra High Court has i n t e r p r e t e d Mithu as au tho -
r i s i n g of the c o u r t in I n d i a t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e s u b s t a -
t i v e p r o v i s i o n s of a law as un reasonab le u n j u s t and u n f a i r , 
25 , I b i d 
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Mlthu has been applied by Andhra H.C. in T. Sareetha 
26 V. Venkata Subbiah for invalidating section 9 of the 
Hindu Marriage Act 1955 providing for the matrimonial remedy 
of rest i tut ion of conjugal r ights . Before Mlthu no one 
could even think of examining the pol icy behind Sec.9 of 
the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. Mlthu enabled the Andhra 
Court t o describe the decree of res t i tut ion as a "savage" 
and barbarious remedy violat ing the right to marital 
privacy implicit in Art. 21. The decrie of rest i tut ion 
* enforcing res t i tut ion of conjugal rights was described by 
the court as const i tut ing the staricettform of governmental 
invaa-lon of personal identi ty and individual zone of 
intimate decis ions. The victim, according to the court, 
was stripped of her control over the various parts of 
her body, subjugated t o the hmiliating sexual molestarticn 
accompained by a forcible loss of the precious right to 
decide when, i f at a l l , her body should be allowed to be 
used to give birth to another human being. Since r e s t i t u -
t ion decree ended up in forcible sexual relation i t v io la-
27 ted Arts.14 and 21. Saysetha demonstrates tha t the 
question whether a Hindu marriage i s a c e l e s t i a l bond or 
a samskara involving sublime sentimants and mutual love 
or i s simply a vehicle for sexual enjoyment i s a matter of 
2 6. AIR 1983 A.P. 356 
27. Id at 37 2 
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j u d i c i a l s c r u t i n y and i t i s t h e c o u r t , not pa r l i ams i t« 
which i s a t r u e r e f l e x of s o c i a l v a l u e s . 
«n The c o u r t in Saifsetha drew i t s su s tbnce from Mithu 
i s c l e a r from t h e fo l lowing read ing of Mithu by Andhra High 
28 Cour t . 
"The r e a s o n i n g of Supreme Court in Mithu*s case 
comes very c l o s e t o the r eason ing adopted by t h e 
American Supreme Court in c a s e s l i k e Lalobart V, 
Ca l i fo rn i a* dec ided upon t h e b a s i s of s u b s t a n t i v e 
due p r o c e s s c l a u s e . Af te r M i t h u ' s c a s e i t i s no t 
easy t o a s s e r t t h a t Art, 21 i s conf ined any l onge r 
t o p r o c e d u r a l p r o t e c t i o n o n l y . Procedure and subs tance 
of law now comingle and overlap each o t h e r t o such 
a degree r e n d e r i n g t h a t a f i n d i n g of any law t h a t can 
comple te ly e s t a b l i s h a v a l i d p rocedu re fo r t h e en fo r -
cement of a savage punishment impossible.** 
2 8 . I d a t 372. 
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•Due- process ' clause has been the most s ignif icant 
single source of jud ic ia l review In the U.S.A. The concept 
of due process of law Is to be traced to the Magha Carta 
of 1215. The phrase "due process of law" did not occur In 
the Magha Carta but In l a t e r s ta tu tes of English law that 
phrase was used synonymously with the phrase "law of the land". 
By the pe t i t ion of r ight of 1628 due process of law was 
understood as a l imi ta t ion upon the arb i t ra ry power of the 
king or the executive. 
The framers of the American Constitution did not put 
the "Due Process" clause" into the or iginal document.The clause 
was included in the b i l l of r igh t s and appears in the f i f th 
and Fourteenth Amendments adopted in 1791 and 1868 respecitvely 
Fifth amendment Imposed a l imi ta t ion upon federal power and 
fourteenth, upon the s t a t e s . 
The word, 'due* i s in terpreted as meaning ' j u s t ' , 
'proper ' or ' reasonable ' . Therefore the couarts can pronounce 
whether a law affecting a person's l i f e , l i be r ty or property 
i s reasonable or not. The court may declare a law Invalid ii i t 
does not accord with i t s notions of what i s jus t and fa i r 
in the cirumstances. 
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The first case in which the supreme Court of United 
States Considered the Due Process clause of the 5th Amendment 
was Murray's lessee V. Hoboken land and Improvement Co. In this 
case the court departed from the meaning of due process as 
understood in England and held that it operated as a limitation 
not only on the executive but on the legislature as well. 
Due process has two aspects, substantive provisions 
of a l3w should be reasonable and not arbitrary. Procedural 
due process envisages a reasonable procedure ,i.e the person 
affected should have Jair right of hearing. Under the concept 
of 'due process' the courts become the arbiter of reasonablenej 
of both substantive as well as procedural provisions in a law. 
Art. 21 of the Indian Constitution is the counterpart of 
Draft Art»15 which, as originally passed by the constituent 
Assembly, provided that "No person shall be deprived of his 
life or liberty without due process of law,". 
Thus the American due process clause was adopted in 
India in Drift .\rt. 15. But the Drafting Committee suggested, 
inter alia, the substitution of the expression "except accordinc 
to procedure established by law" for the words "without due 
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process of law". The reason given for the change was that 
the substituted expresion was more specific. Both substantive 
and procedural "due process" were well established in the 
United states/ and though the concept of "due process " 
was vague and flexible it was used to enforce certain standards 
to which according to the majority of Judges of the U.S. 
Supreme Court substantive and procedural lav/s had to conform. 
However, the abuse of substantive due process by the US. 
Supreme Court produced second thoughts and "due process" was 
replaced by procedure established by law". This change was 
the result of a discussion which the constitutional Adviser, 
Sir B.N, Rao had with Mr. Justice Frankfurter: of the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 
Art.21 of the Indian Constitution lays down that no 
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except, 
according to 'procedure established by law. The question of 
interpretation of the words 'procedure established by law' 
arose in the famous Gopalan case. The main question was 
whether the words procedure established by law' adopted in 
Art. 21 corresponds to the American concept of due process i.e. 
Whether Art- 21 envisaged any procedure laid down by a law 
enacted by a legislature or whether the procedure should be 
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fa i r and reasonable. The supreme Court held tha t the expression 
"procedure established by law" in t h i s Art, was not to be 
given a wide and ra ther fluid meaning of the expression "due 
process of law" under the American cons t i tu t ion . I t means only 
state-made law of a statutory o^^igin. The court pointed out 
tha t the const i tuent Assembly had del iberate ly rejected the 
expression "due process of law". I t had preferred to adopt 
the expression 'procedure established by law borrowed from 
Art. 32 of the Japanese cons t i tu t ion . The view of the majority 
in the words of Patanjal l Sas t r i J . i s as under. 
"Giving ful l effect to these 
Pr inciples , however, I am unable 
to agree that the term 'law* in 
Art- 21 means the immutable 
and universal pr inciples of 
natural j u s t i c e . Procedure es tab-
l ished by IdW ' must be taken 
to refer to a procedure which 
has a s tatutory or ig in , for no 
procedure i s known or can be 
said to have been establ ished 
by such vague and uncertain 
concepts as the immutable 
and universal pr inc ip les of 
natural jus t i ce •. In my opinion, 
'lav; • in Art, 21 means posi t ive 
or state-made law", ^ 
1, A,K. Gopaln V, State of Madras AIR 1950 SC.27. 
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Gopalan held the field for almost three decades. Gopalan 
settled two major points in relation to Art» 21. One Art. 19 
and Arts. 21 and 22 were mutually exclusive and that Art. 19 
was not to apply to a law affecting personal liberty covM 
not be declared unconstitutional merely because it lacked 
natural Justice or due procedure. 
As interpreted in Gopalan, Art, 21 provided no protection 
or immunity against competent legislative action. Art. 21 gave 
^ Carte blanche to a legislature to enact a law to provide 
for cirrest of a person without much procedural safeguard. It 
gave final say to the legislature to determine what was goin^ 
to be the procedure to curtail the personal liberty of a 
person in a given situation and what procedural safeguards^ 
he would enjoy. Because of the impotence of Art. 21 as a 
protection against legislative action, it may not be correct 
to assume that the constitutional provision was of no value. 
Art. 21 served as a restraint upon the executive which 
could not proceed against an individual to curtail his 
personal liberty save within the four corners of the law. It 
resulted in several postulates. A person could not be 
deprived of his life or personal liberty merely by an executive 
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fiat without there being a valid law to support it. 
In course of time, this rigid judicial view was 
softened somewhat. The beginning of the new trend is to be 
found in the Bank Nationalization case decided in 1970 where 
in Art. 19(1) (f) was applied to a law. enacted under Art. 
31(2). But hitherto the marked distinctions between due 
process* clause and the 'procedure established by law' had 
been maintained throughout. 
Maneka was believed to have resurrected American 
Procedural due process in Art. 21 which was freed from the 
confines of Gopalan on 'Procedure'. As a result of Maneka 
for the first time the principles of natural justice came 
to be included within the Scope ot Art, 21. Maneka's case 
has laid down that personal liberty can not be cut out or 
cut down without fair legal procedure. 
Maneka thus projected the concept of reasonableness 
of Art 14 in the procedure contemplated under Art. 21 in order 
to produce the effects of American procedural due process. 
Ironically, the allpervasive omniprsence of reasonableness 
of Art. 14 equality- equal protection guarantee was discovered 
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by the supreme Court only In the year 1978. When the 
constituent Assembly in rejecting due process* would 
never have intended to include the same concept in the equa-
lity guarantee. Be that as it may, the procedural due 
process had become an integral part of a procedure in Art. 21 
as a result of Maneka, But Art. 21 still remained the 
embodiment of procedural due process and had not matured as 
a limitation against legislative action • 
In A.K. Roy Chief Justice Chandrachud reaffirmed 
his Maneka position that Art. 21 did not permit judicial 
review of reasonableness of the substantive portion of the 
law. It was only in 1982 subsequent to A.K. Hoy when Justice 
Bhagwati in Bachan Singh interpreted 'procedure* itself as 
including both substantive and procedural due process. 
since A.K« Roy came .as an obstacle to such kind of 
judicial inquiry, in Mithu* the chief justice chandrachud 
found the opinion of Justice Krishna Iyer in sunil 
Batra as of great help to him. After quoting with approval 
the observation of Justice Krishna Iyer that "true our cons-
titution has no due process clause but after Maneka Gandhi the 
1. Mithu VS state of Punjab (1983) 2 SCC 278. 
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consequence i s the same", he extracted the following obser-
vation of Jus t ice Desai in the same case. 
"The word 'law • in the expression 
'procedure establ ished by law' in 
Art.21 has been interpreted in Maneka 
Gandhi's case that law must be right* j u s t and f a i r and not a rb i t ra ry , fanciful 
or Qppresive". 
Therefore, the swing of the pendulum clear ly indi-
cates that the deprivation of the l i be r ty , i^ Jfc i t merely 
answers*- the procedure, i t wi l l not be suff ic ient . That 
procedure must be fa i r and reasonable. Fairness and 
reasonableness must answer the pr inc ip les of natural jus t ice . 
To stun up, today to meet a challenge tha t Art, 21 
has not been violated i t must be establ ished that both 
the substantive law and the procedural law have been 
complied with. 
1. Id at 284. 
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